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COURT DECLARES 'NO TRESPASS'
THE THREE BRANCHES AND THE STATES SHOULD GO TO THEIR RESPECTIVE CORNERS.
The National Law Journal
Monday, July 14, 1997
Harvey Berkman
HIGHWAY road crews periodically repaint faded
dividing lines to restore their clarity and brightness.
According to several scholars, that's what the U.S.
Supreme Court did in the 1997 spring term: merely
retouch the lines on the familiar Constitutional
highway.
In a stunning finale, the justices-sometimes by
fractious majorities and other times with little
dissent-reminded citizens and the government that the
Constitution's framers carefully delineated power
among three distinct, co- equal branches of
government, and the federal level and the states.
The court ended its term with a remarkable series of
decisions involving the Constitution's separation of
powers, a longtime interest of Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist.
If many Americans have grown to believe that the
Constitution gives Congress the power to pass laws
concerning just about anything that implicates the
national interest, the Rehnquist court corrected that
impression by striking three federal laws in a week:
the Brady gun control act, the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act and the Communications Decency Act.
But all was not a show of judicial power. The court
also delineated its own limits. The justices declined to
resolve the constitutionality of President Clinton's new
line-item veto power on grounds that the plaintiffs,
members of Congress, lacked standing.
The court also refused-unanimously-to remove from
the political branches and claim for itself the ability to
determine the contours of any right for the terminally
ill to seek a doctor-assisted suicide.
Brady Act's Fall
Scholars across the political spectrum are saying that,
as dramatic as the last set of decisions was, the court
was merely doing repair work on the separation of
powers.
"There's a tremendous amount of preposterous
hullabaloo about how the federal government is being
restricted. The idea that the Brady Bill's downfall
suggests a return to the pre-New Deal court, with its
rigid limits on federal power, is nonsense," says
Stanford Law School emeritus Prof. Gerald Gunther,
a self-described Democrat and unrepentant fan of New
Deal-like expressions of congressional power.
Professor Gunther says the court's 5-4 decision in
Printzv. U.S., 95-1478, which struck the provision of
the federal Brady law that ordered local sheriffs to
check the backgrounds of potential handgun buyers,
was clearly forecast by New York v. U.S., 505 U.S.
144 (1992). In that case, the court forbade Congress to
"commandeer" state legislatures and order them to
pass particular laws (those involving the handling of
nuclear waste).
"While congressional power to regulate commerce is
very broad, it does not include the power to conscript
state officials to do work," Professor Gunther says. "I
don't think that's a horrible limit on congressional
powers, and, indeed, it's one that very rarely is called
into play."
Deborah Merritt-a law professor who donated money
to Sarah Brady's gun- control group, but then wrote a
law review article against the Brady law's use of
sheriffs that Justice Antonin Scalia cited in
Printz-echoes Professor Gunther's views. The
legislative and the executive branches "tried to assert
pretty far-reaching powers and made sweeping claims,
and the court just rejected them," says Professor
Merritt, who teaches at Ohio State University College
of Law.
Religious Freedom Act Struck
Moreover, the court's 6-3 decision striking the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, while dramatic,
breaks no new ground, experts say. City of Boerne v.
Flores, 95-2074.
RFRA sought to help individuals exempt themselves
on religious grounds from general state laws. It
reversed a Supreme Court ruling that the Constitution
did not require states to meet the highest
standard-showing a compelling interest-before
subjecting religious objectors to challenged statutes.
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But the justices said RFRA had exceeded the authority
on which lawmakers relied: Sec. 5 of the 14th
Amendment, which empowers Congress to pass laws
implementing the amendment's guarantee of civil
rights.
Congress may have the power to enforce those rights,
the RFRA majority said, but it is the court-and only the
court-that defines just what those rights are.
"Congress pushed Sec. 5 to its outermost limits and
virtually invited the court's response," says Prof. A.E.
Dick Howard, who teaches courses on the Constitution
and the Supreme Court at the University of Virginia
School of Law.
It didn't help, Professor Howard adds, that RFRA not
only questioned the court's authority to interpret the
constitution, but also infringed on the sovereignty of
the states to boot.
Bruce Fein, a Justice Department official under
President Reagan who writes frequently about the
judiciary from a conservative point of view, agrees that
the effects of this term's institutional cases will be
relatively insignificant.
"As a practical matter, I don't think that the court's
decisions are really pivotal in how our federalism
system will unfold in coming years," he says.
To get around the ruling in Printz, for example,
lawmakers can simply offer to pay for the time of any
sheriffs who agree to perform the background
checks-or threaten to withhold crime-related grants
from any sheriffs who don't.
Bribe or threat, Mr. Fein says, the states refuse such
requests infrequently. But "certainly when Congress
is willing to pay, the states are more than willing to
sell their federalism soul for a mess of pottage."
Spending Matters
And Professor Howard says he considers it unlikely
that even a court this sensitive to issues of separation
of powers will begin evaluating the constitutional
propriety of congressional budget items and riders.
"I haven't seen any evidence that the court is inclined
to revisit its carte blanche to the federal government to
attach any conditions as they will to the spending of
federal money," he says. "On the other hand, I've often
been puzzled by that [latitude], and maybe that's the
next line of attack.
"Like [the 14th Amendment's] Sec. 5, the spending
power is not limitless. Maybe that's the last frontier.
If the court reaches that question, then we're in for
some thorough reordering of Congress' business. But
it's going to be hard to get five votes to go into that
territory," Professor Howard says.
Limited Reach of Opinions
The difficulty in getting five votes to enter new
territory has produced clear limits to the reach of some
of the majority opinions.
For example, in U.S. v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624, the
Supreme Court's landmark 1995 opinion invalidating
the federal law prohibiting possession of a gun within
1,000 feet of a school, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy's
concurrence (joined by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor)
expressly reaffirmed the court's expansive
interpretation of the power of Congress to regulate
interstate commerce.
The Lopez ruling may have declared for the first time
in 60 years that a federal statute exceeded Congress'
commerce clause power. But much of the opinion, and
certainly the Kennedy-O'Connor concurrence,
suggested less a retrenching of the court's commerce
clause jurisprudence than a belief that the power can't
be boundless, and that a law making it a federal crime
to carry a gun near a school exceeded whatever bounds
there are.
"Under the Constitution, the federal government can
substantively regulate almost anything it wants,"
Professor Merritt says. "Lopez doesn't change that
much. The Kennedy and O'Connor concurrence
makes clear that they're not going to overrule the New
Deal."
Agrees Professor Howard: "Lopez was a useful shot
across Congress' bow. Even if very few cases will turn
on Lopez-and I think few will-I think it's quite salutary
for Congress to be reminded that the grants of power
are not infinitely elastic," he says.
"The same thing happened with RFRA: Congress had
slipped into a mode that if you invoke [the 14th
Amendment's] Sec. 5, the court will roll over and play
dead. But in Boerne, the court came to life," Professor
Howard says.
Conflicting Concurrences
Professor Gunther says cases like Lopez and Boerne
result less from any incipient high court activism
trampling the political branches than from an increase
in congressional indolence.
"Lawmakers have gotten so lazy that they feel they
can legislate and let the court do the rest of the work,"
he says. "That's what [Justice Stephen G.] Breyer did
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in Lopez: He did the research [showing how students'
possession of guns affects interstate commerce] for
them. The appendix to his opinion [listing scores of
studies] was his research, not Congress', as to what the
impact on commerce might be."
Similarly, Justice O'Connor's concurrence in the
Brady case noted that the court was not ruling that
"other purely ministerial reporting requirements
imposed by Congress on state and local authorities
pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers are similarly
invalid." (For example, federal law requires state and
local law enforcement agencies to report missing
children to the Department of Justice.)
In comparison, in both Lopez and Printz, Justice
Clarence Thomas filed concurrences saying that if he
had his way, the court would skip the fine line-
drawing and instead review-with the goal of
"temper[ing]" -its entire line of commerce clause
jurisprudence, a broad reading that bars the federal
government from few areas of American life.
That his suggestion was, in both cases, a lone
concurrence with the majority, and not a lone dissent
from it, shows how far the court has traveled in its
view of federalism since Associate Justice Rehnquist
became known as the lone dissenter more than 20
years ago.
At the same time, the repeated failure of Justice
Thomas' suggestion to attract any support also
indicates the limited effect cases like Lopez and Printz
are ultimately likely to have.
Other Challenges
The court's new direction is already engendering new
challenges to laws, but not many are succeeding.
One appellate court after another has upheld against
commerce clause challenges the federal carjacking
statute; the federal law making it a crime to impede
entry into abortion facilities; and the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act-and the Supreme Court has never granted
certiorari to any frustrated defendant under any of
those laws.
"Congress compiled a compelling case before they
passed the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances
Act," Mr. Fein notes. "You had some sheriffs sitting
on their hands and saying [the clinics] are murdering
little babies, you had evidence that state and local
officers would stand aside and watch assaults on
abortion providers take place."
Still, many academics say some federal laws may be
vulnerable. For example, the federal Motor-Voter law
requires state motor vehicle officials to handle federal
voting registration-exposing the law to a Printz
challenge.
Also, the Violence Against Women Act, or VAWA,
creates a federal cause of action for victims of rape to
sue their attackers when they can allege that the
assault was motivated by a gender-based animus.
Open to Challenge
Professor Merritt says the act could be open to a
high-court challenge under Lopez as exceeding the
reasonable limits of the commerce clause-Congress
said gender-motivated violence affects the ability of
women to engage in commerce-as well as to a
challenge under Boerne, as the act was predicated in
part on Sec. 5 of the 14th Amendment.
However, in contrast to RFRA, Professor Merritt says,
VAWA was passed after extensive hearings. While
RFRA was the subject of no hearings on how state laws
were trampling religious convictions, VAWA hearings
produced testimony on how local police mishandle
women's claims, and how female victims fare in the
states' judicial systems.
In July 1996, Chief Judge Jackson L. Kiser, of the
Western District of Virginia, dismissed a VAWA suit
on the grounds that, like Lopez, the activity at issue "is
too remote from interstate commerce," and on the
grounds that it also exceeded congressional power
under the 14th Amendment because it was directed at
individuals, not states. Oral arguments were heard in
the 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in June.
Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State
University, 96-1814.
"That sounds like something the court will uphold as
part of Congress' power to enforce the 14th
Amendment," Professor Merritt says. "But at this
point, it's just not clear."
Copyright 1997 by the New York Law Publishing
Company
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SUPREME COURT GRANTS STATES A POWER SURGE
Los Angeles Times
Sunday, June 29, 1997
David G. Savage
WASHINGTON -- The justices of the Supreme
Court, having handed down final opinions, left town
for their summer recess this weekend, and President
Clinton and members of Congress were probably glad
to see them go.
Boldly striking down newly enacted laws, the justices
showed little regard for the power and prerogatives of
the lawmakers who meet on the opposite side of First
Street, N.E. They showed even less respect for "the
individual who happens to be the president," as they
said unanimously in this year's most famous case of
alleged sexual harassment.
And perhaps more so than ever before, the court's
conservative majority showed itself determined to shift
power away from Washington and toward officials of
the 50 states.
As Justice Antonin Scalia said on the term's final day,
liberty is best protected and the "risk of tyranny" best
avoided by preserving "a healthy balance of power
between the states and the federal government."
And the current court thinks that balance will be
preserved only if it puts its weight heavily on the side
of the states.
Sometimes, preserving states' power means protecting
them from claims of individual rights.
On Thursday, for example, the court unanimously
upheld state laws against doctor-assisted suicide and
rejected the claim that terminally ill people have a
"right to die."
The states are free to change their laws but need not
do so, said Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist.
Sometimes, preserving states' power means protecting
them from lawsuits.
In April, for example, the court threw out a
class-action lawsuit filed by single parents in Arizona
who sought to hold state officials accountable for their
5% success rate in child-support collections.
Though the state's performance had been "dismal," as
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor put it, her majority
opinion nonetheless shielded the state and its officials
from being sued.
Sometimes, achieving that "balance of power" means
upholding new and far- reaching state criminal laws,
even when constitutional rights are at stake.
Last Wednesday, the court upheld the power of state
officials to keep sex criminals locked up even after
they have served their prison terms. Speaking for a 5-4
majority, Justice Clarence Thomas said this indefinite
extra incarceration for those who are deemed "sexual
predators" is not truly "punishment" and therefore does
not violate the Constitutional protection against double
jeopardy.
And as the last week illustrated, sometimes striking
the balance means reining in the power of Congress.
In three quick strokes, the court knocked down all or
parts of three new laws championed by Clinton and
passed overwhelmingly by Congress: the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act protecting actions based on
religious belief, the Communications Decency Act
regulating computer pornography and the Brady Act
regulating handgun sales.
The religious freedom legislation required state and
local officials to give special deference to legal claims
involving religion. This dispute began more than seven
years ago when Oregon officials fired two Native
Americans for using peyote, an illegal drug. The
Native Americans said it was part of their religious
experience.
While state and local officials may give special
exemptions in law for religious claims, Congress
cannot force them to do so, Justice Anthony M.
Kennedy said.
The Brady Act ran afoul of the court because it forced
local sheriffs to conduct background checks on
potential gun buyers.
The president not only saw his favorite measures
struck down, he was also personally rebuffed twice by
the court in the past month.
The justices unanimously rejected his claim that, as
the nation's chief executive, he should be granted
"temporary immunity" from civil lawsuits such as the
one filed by Paula Corbin Jones, who has accused
Clinton of sexual harassment. And last week, the court
dismissed without comment his claim of
confidentiality for the notes taken by White House
lawyers in meetings with First Lady Hillary Rodham
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Clinton, notes sought by Whitewater independent
counsel Kenneth W. Starr for his probe.
Congress' members were not spared either.
As if to add personal insult to political injury, the
court ruled Thursday that U.S. senators and
representatives have no standing in court to challenge
the constitutionality of laws such as the Line Item Veto
Act. An ordinary citizen who is injured in some way by
a vetoed government program can sue, the court said,
but not a lawmaker who claims his power has been
reduced.
These rulings certainly reflect the dominant concerns
of Rehnquist.
Twenty-five years ago, he joined the court as its most
conservative member, and from the start he displayed
a clear and unwavering view of the Constitution.
Then, the dominant liberals were still pushing to
expand individual rights. For example, in the famed
Miranda case, the court had ruled that a police officer's
failure to warn a suspect of his right to remain silent
led to a type of unfair self-incrimination. In the 1973
Roe vs. Wade decision, the court announced a new
right to abortion.
Rehnquist said these decisions were unwise and
unwarranted because they did not stem from what the
framers of the Constitution intended. In his view, the
document leaves most government decisions to state
legislatures, city councils and local boards, not to
Congress, federal agencies or judges. The voters and
their representatives can create new rights, but the
court should not do so, he said.
Now, finishing his 11th year as chief justice, he has
gone a long way toward writing his views into law.
Rehnquist does not always win. In 1992, he fell one
vote short of overturning Roe vs. Wade and sending
the abortion question back to the states.
He dissented last year when the court struck down a
controversial Colorado voter initiative that would have
revoked laws protecting gay men and lesbians from
discrimination. And two years ago, he dissented when
a 5-4 majority struck down a move by Arkansas voters
to limit the terms of their members of Congress.
In the term just ended, Rehnquist was in the majority
in all of the court's major rulings, with the exception of
a partial dissent in the computer pornography case
decided last week.
That landmark ruling extending the free-speech
principle to the Internet gave liberals their one cause
for celebration.
Still, it is easy to exaggerate the importance of the
court's rulings, especially those involving the
"structural arrangement" of government power.
Presumably, not many people roll out of bed in the
morning anxious about the "balance of power"
between the states and the federal government. Should
they ponder the matter, they may not be comforted by
the news that their freedom and welfare will be
entrusted to lawmakers in Sacramento rather than
those in Washington.
It remains doubtful that the court's conservatives will
radically alter the government balance of power in a
way that affects ordinary Americans. So far, the
Rehnquist majority has targeted only obscure laws or
smaller parts of well- known laws.
For example, the justices last year voided a part of the
federal Indian Gaming Regulatory Act that required
governors to negotiate with tribal leaders over
gambling.
Two years ago, the court struck down the federal Gun
Free Schools Zone Act, characterizing it as
unnecessary, feel-good legislation passed by a
grandstanding Congress. Every state already had such
a law on the books.
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act was probably
unknown to most people until it was struck down last
week.
In past opinions, Kennedy and O'Connor made clear
they do not want to dramatically roll back federal
power. Instead, they want to announce limits on new
federal intrusions on states' rights.
The court's stand on states' rights might affect some
environmental measures, legal experts say, because
they require compliance from state agencies.
Unlike the rulings on state versus federal power, the
decisions involving individual rights can have an
immediate impact.
Had the court upheld a "right to die," terminally ill
people could have chosen for themselves how to end
their lives. The high court's approach leaves the
outcome in the hands of the states.
But then, it would have been most unlike the
Rehnquist court to announce a radical change in the
law based on a new interpretation of the Constitution.
Voters and their representatives are now debating
"how best to protect dignity and independence at the
end of life," Rehnquist said. "In a democratic society,
that's the way it should be.
Copyright 1997; The Times Mirror Company
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SUPREME COURT AIMS GAVEL AT CONGRESS
The Arizona Republic
Sunday, June 29, 1997
Aaron Epstein, Knight-Ridder
With a whirlwind finish, the Supreme Court justices
ended a 1996-97 term that, more than any in recent
years, bolstered the states, curbed federal power and
altered the delicate relationship of government and
religion.
In the last week alone, the court tore up recently
enacted laws on gun control, religious rights and smut
in cyberspace and, for the first time, permitted
public-school teachers to instruct children in parochial
classrooms. Then, on Friday, the justices quietly
slipped away for a long summer rest.
"The pattern is clear," remarked A.E. Dick Howard,
a University of Virginia law professor who has tracked
Supreme Court developments for many years. "They
care about the states and about protecting them from
Congress.
"They want to trim the powers of the federal
government and give local communities control over
local problems. It parallels the country's mood."
To many observers, it was no surprise the justices
found no right to an assisted death and upheld state
laws barring doctors from helping terminally ill
patients to die. These justices are reluctant to create
new personal rights.
In several of their decisions, the justices made it
abundantly clear that, despite the high visibility and
enormous powers of the president and the Congress,
there is another branch of government in town.
And in matters of constitutional dimension, it is the
Supreme Court's duty "to say what the law is,"
declared Justice Anthony Kennedy, whose vote
continued to be pivotal in the nearly all close cases.
In one case, Kennedy, a former law-school teacher,
delivered a stinging civics lesson to the Congress and
the White House.
When "the political branches of the government" try
to undo the Supreme Court's reading of the
Constitution, he wrote for the court's conservative
majority, "it must be understood that ... the court will
treat its precedents with the respect due them . and
contrary expectations must be disappointed."
What the message meant, Howard said, was that "
'conservative' doesn't mean being weak-kneed about
your own turf. This court will defend its turf. To call it
a court of judicial restraint would be a misnomer.
That's not what this court is about."
Looking to the future, Ronald Rotunda, a law
professor at the University of Illinois, said two rulings
in particular changed the law and may carry the seeds
of future change.
First, he said, the decision overturning the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act was "very dramatic and very
important."
"It raises questions about a host of federal laws that
create new rights against the states, such as the
Americans With Disabilities Act," he said.
He attached special significance, too, to a decision
that allows public schools to finance and conduct
remedial and enrichment courses in religious schools.
"It sets the stage for the constitutionality of private
vouchers, kindergarten through 12th grade," he said.
"The government would give money to parents, and
they pick the schools they want, public or private."
As in past years at the court, racial minorities,
criminal defendants and prisoners fared badly.
The court decreed that one predominantly black
congressional district in Georgia was enough, and it
allowed states to lock up sexual offenders on civil
commitments when their prison terms are over.
The Clinton administration didn't have a particularly
good year, either. Nor did the president himself. He
failed to fend off Paula Jones' sexual-harassment suit
or keep lawyers' notes of conversations with the first
lady out of the hands of Whitewater prosecutor
Kenneth Starr.
When it came to the deeply divisive issues that
Americans care most about - race, religion, crime and
punishment - the conservative majority wrote the law.
On most ideologically divided questions, this is a
Reagan-Bush court, not a Clinton court.
In half of the 18 cases decided by 5-4 votes this term,
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the court's five most conservative members - Chief
Justice William Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia,
Clarence Thomas, Sandra Day O'Connor and Anthony
Kennedy - held together to eke out significant
victories.
All five owe their current seats to Republicans Ronald
Reagan and George Bush, as does David Souter. John
Paul Stevens was appointed by President Ford.
The two Clinton appointees, Ruth Bader Ginsburg
and Stephen Breyer, joined the majority in only a
handful of the 5-4 cases, and they were generally of
lesser interest.
More than usual, the court delved into questions of
how government powers must be apportioned -
between Washington and the states and within the
federal government itself. And if the states were the
clear winners, the judicial gavel was hurled especially
at Congress.
"After several years of feeling its way, the court's
personality is now clearly emerging," said Steven R.
Shapiro, national legal director of the American Civil
Liberties Union. "This is a court that generally
supports free speech. It also believes in states' rights.
And it is more skeptical of federal authority than any
court in recent history."
The justices completed their term by shooting down
the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act of 1993
as an improper invasion of state and local authority.
The act required local police to make background
checks on people who want to purchase handguns. A
pair of small-county sheriffs complained in lawsuits of
the time and costs of such checks, one of them saying
his deputies wouldn't be able to respond to "a domestic
abuse in progress or any number of serious things."
A footnote: If you live in Alaska, Arizona, California,
Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon or
Washington state, don't bet on the durability of any
important ruling of the regional circuit court.
In the term ended Friday, the Supreme Court
reviewed an extraordinarily high number of cases - 29
-from the San Francisco-based U.S. Court of Appeals
for the 9th Circuit and reversed 27 of them, according
to statistics compiled by TomGoldstein, a Washington
lawyer.
For the circuit judges, many of whom are liberals,
that's a batting average of .069 at the major-league
judicial level, which could be something of a record.
"If they were baseball players," Goldstein said,
"they'd have to take up a new sport."
Copyright 1997
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COURT'S RULINGS CHECK CONGRESS;
WHITE HOUSE ANALYSTS SAY
STATES' RIGHTS FARED WELL IN JUSTICES' TERM
The Dallas Morning News
Monday, June 30, 1997
David Jackson
WASHINGTON -The Supreme Court used this term
to remind Congress and the White House that they
aren't the only sources of power in town.
In a busy last week, the justices told Congress it could
not force local police to do background checks on gun
buyers, could not suppress "indecency" on the Internet,
and could not set a new constitutional standard for
religious liberty.
During its 1996-97 term, the high court unanimously
said presidents must answer civil lawsuits, specifically
Paula Jones' charge of sexual harassment against
President Clinton. It also forced the White House to
give Whitewater prosecutors notes of chats between
first lady Hillary Rodham Clinton and
government-paid lawyers.
The court did permit President Clinton to use the
line-item veto, but only because the six members of
Congress who sued over the law lacked proper legal
standing.
State governments, on the other hand, maintained
power. The Supreme Court preserved states' rights to
ban doctor-assisted suicides. It also upheld a Kansas
law allowing "violent sexual predators" to be
committed to mental institutions after their prison
terms.
"On my scoreboard, it reads that Congress loses, the
president loses, but the states win," said Susan Low
Bloch, law professor at Georgetown University. "I
don't recall ever seeing the court strike down three acts
of Congress in a week."
Analysts said these decisions amount to victory for
five court conservatives who have long pursued their
notions of "federalism," the allocation of power
between the federal government and states.
"It clearly emerged that the conservatives are
determined to reduce federal power vis-a-vis the
states," said Paul Rothstein, who teaches law at
Georgetown.
The nine-member court's conservative bloc consists
of five Republican appointees: Chief Justice William
Rehnquist and Associate Justices Antonin Scalia,
Clarence Thomas, Sandra Day O'Connor and Anthony
Kennedy.
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, however, are often
swing votes in negotiations with the four more liberal
court members: John Paul Stevens, David Souter, Ruth
Bader Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer.
The court's last decision this term, striking down a
provision of the Brady gun control law, reflected the
members' stark differences over federalism.
Writing for a 5-4 majority, Justice Scalia said
Congress could not order local police to make
background checks on gun buyers. He argued that the
framers of the Constitution gave Congress "the power
to regulate individuals, not states."
"The great innovation of this design was that our
citizens would have two political capacities, one state
and one federal, each protected from incursion by the
other," Justice Scalia wrote.
Writing for the four dissenters, Justice Stevens argued
that nothing in the Constitution blocks Congress from
getting state help on national problems, from the
"epidemic of gun violence" to the search for missing
children.
"Since the ultimate issue is one of power, we must
consider its implications in times of national
emergency," Justice Stevens wrote.
The court was more united in defending its right to
interpret the law. In passing a law requiring
governments to prove a "compelling reason" for
interfering with any religious practice, Congress
essentially reversed a Supreme Court ruling in 1990.
The justices said they have the right to interpret the
Constitution, not Congress. In a zoning dispute
between a Catholic Church and the city of Boerne,
Texas, the court reaffirmed its belief that government
actions can be applied to religions as long as the laws
are enforced equally throughout society. Three
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dissenting justices did not defend Congress' action, but
instead criticized their colleagues' interpretation of the
law.
The justices reserved judgment on the line-item veto,
which allows presidents to veto individual projects and
tax items within massive spending bills. President
Clinton himself expects another legal challenge once
he uses the new tool.
"They want to wait until I 'X' something and then
complain," Mr. Clinton joked to reporters.
The president had two personal defeats before the
court - the Jones and Whitewater cases. White House
officials said the Jones decision makes future
presidents vulnerable to legal harassment, while the
Whitewater notes case will inhibit discussions between
government officials and lawyers.
Chief Justice Rehnquist and his conservative
colleagues have also opposed judicially-created
constitutional rights. This term, the justices
unanimously overruled lower court attempts to
establish a right to doctor-assisted suicide, though
some said they would review the issue if states legalize
the practice.
Critics of the Rehnquist Court say it opposes
individual rights and threatens the advances of women
and minorities. Civil rights advocates were displeased
when the court ruled that race cannot be the major
factor in drawing congressional districts, saying it will
reduce minority political representation.
In this past term, the justices who two years ago
struck down a Georgia plan with three black districts
upheld a plan with only one. Both cases were 5-4
votes.
Affirmative action is likely to be a key topic in the
court's next term, which starts in October. The court
has agreed to hear the case of a New Jersey school
board that retained a black teacher over a white one in
order to preserve racial diversity.
Civil libertarians did score one major win this term.
The Supreme Court struck down the Communications
Decency Act, an effort by Congress to keep smut in
cyberspace away from children. By a 7-2 vote, the
justices said the law invaded the free speech rights of
adults.
Conservative justices continued to give law
enforcement officials more authority at the expense of
defendants' rights, such as in the 5-4 vote favoring the
Kansas "sexual predator" law. They also allowed
police to order all passengers out of cars during traffic
stops and continued to restrict avenues of appeal for
death row inmates.
Yet most analysts identified federalism as the key
theme of this term. Erwin Chemerinsky, law professor
at the University of Southern California, lamented the
trend, saying it has been used in history to block
advances like the New Deal and civil rights.
"Federalism has always been important for political
conservatives," he said. "It's often a way of stopping
government from doing things they don't like."
Douglas Kmiec, a law professor at Notre Dame, said
there are good reasons to preserve the federalist
principle. Mr. Kmiec said presidents cannot appear to
be above the law and that local sheriffs should not be
ordered around by Congress.
"I'm fond of calling this the term of constitutional
common sense," Mr. Kmiec said.
Congress and the president can fight back. They can
adjust laws within the court's guidelines. Supporters of
the Brady law and the Communications Decency Act
are now exploring alternatives.
Elected officials can also amend the constitution,
though that takes a two-thirds vote of Congress and
approval by three-fourths of the state legislatures. Still,
religious groups are promoting an amendment to
counter last week's Boerne ruling.
Presidents, meanwhile, can appoint new justices, but
have to wait for someone to retire or die. The court's
next opening will be crucial, given many controversial
5-4 rulings.
Congress' ultimate weapon, analysts said, would be
laws to restrict the Supreme Court's jurisdiction.
Copyright 1997
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JUSTICES LIMIT BRADY GUN LAW AS INTRUSION ON STATES' RIGHTS
The New York Times
June 28, 1997
Linda Greenhouse
Providing the strongest evidence yet of the ascension
of state power at the Supreme Court, a bitterly divided
Court ruled today that the Brady gun control law
violated "the very principle of separate state
sovereignty" by requiring state officials to conduct
background checks of prospective handgun purchasers.
The 5-to-4 decision, invalidating the
background-check provision of the 1993 law, marked
the third time in as many days that the Court
overturned a major Federal statute. Earlier in the week,
the Justices struck down both the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act and the Communications Decency Act
before concluding their 1996-97 term today. The
decision today did not address a separate portion of the
Brady law that imposes a five-day waiting period
before a gun sale can be completed, leaving that
provision intact at least for now.
The decision opened a new chapter in a profound
and continuing debate among the Justices over the
essential nature of the system of shared authority
between the Federal Government and the states. Justice
Antonin Scalia's majority opinion and the principal
dissenting opinion by Justice John Paul Stevens ranged
deeply into the nation's history, each disputing the
other on the meaning of particular passages in the
Federalist Papers as well as about how to interpret the
Court's rulings on federalism over the years. [Excerpts
from the opinions, page 8.]
President Clinton and Congressional supporters of
the Brady law, which was named for James S. Brady,
the former White House press secretary who was shot
and gravely wounded in the attempted assassination of
President Ronald Reagan in 1981, said today that they
would work to find an alternative to the invalidated
provision.
Although Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist simply
joined Justice Scalia's opinion today, without writing
separately, the outcome was a triumph for the Chief
Justice. He began his Supreme Court service 25 years
ago as a critic of what he saw as the Court's
aggrandizement of Federal power, and now presides
over a solid, if narrow bloc, of five Justices who, in
case after case, are aggressively readjusting the
state-Federal balance in favor of the states.
Besides Justice Scalia and the Chief Justice, the
majority today comprised Justices Sandra Day
O'Connor, Anthony M. Kennedy and Clarence
Thomas. This was the same five-Justice majority that
two years ago, in a case called United States v. Lopez,
ruled that a Federal law banning the possession of
guns near schools exceeded Congressional authority.
That decision was the first time since the New Deal
that the Court had invalidated an exercise of
Congress's asserted authority to regulate interstate
commerce.
Last year the same five Justices made up the majority
in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, which invalidated a 1988
Federal law on Indian gambling and held that
Congress lacked the authority to permit Indian tribes
to sue state governments in Federal court.
In addition to Justice Stevens, the dissenters today,
as in the earlier two cases, were Justices David H.
Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer.
While the ruling today, Printz v. United States, No.
95-1478, alluded both to Congressional power under
the Commerce Clause as well as to state authority
under the 10th Amendment, which gives to the states
the powers that the Constitution does not otherwise
give to the Federal Government, Justice Scalia's
opinion was not based on any one constitutional
provision.
Rather, Justice Scalia based his conclusion on his
view of the constitutional structure as a whole. He
described the state and national governments as
coequal sovereigns, coexisting on a political and
constitutional level of equivalence. "This separation of
the two spheres is one of the Constitution's structural
protections of liberty," Justice Scalia said.
He said it was no more acceptable for state and local
officials to be required to administer Federal laws
"than it would be compatible with the independence
and autonomy of the United States that its officers be
impressed into service for the execution of state laws."
The Court's conclusion was "categorical," Justice
Scalia said; there could be no "balancing analysis" that
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could give more weight to the Federal interests at stake
in particular circumstances.
Against this vision, the dissenters put forward a
diametrically opposite concept of the state-Federal
relationship. Justice Stevens said it was clear that
when Congress acted within one of its express grants
of constitutional authority -- in this case, its power
under the Commerce Clause -- the Federal
Government was supreme and its actions were binding
on the states. He noted that Article VI of the
Constitution declares that Federal law "shall be the
supreme Law of the Land" and requires state officials
to take an oath to support the Constitution.
"Not only the Constitution, but every law enacted by
Congress as well," Justice Stevens said, "establishes
policy for the states just as firmly as do laws enacted by
state legislatures." He said that "there is not a clause,
sentence or paragraph in the entire text of the
Constitution of the United States that supports the
proposition that a local police officer can ignore a
command contained in a statute enacted by Congress"
acting under one of its constitutional powers.
While Justice Scalia described the Brady law as a
direct Federal assault on the states, Justice Stevens said
the law imposed at most a "trivial burden" and "modest
duties" on local law-enforcement officials.
In states that have not adopted their own
background-check system under state law, as 27 states
have done, the law requires the local officials to take
"reasonable" efforts to check criminal records within
a five-day waiting period to determine whether there is
a reason a would-be buyer of a handgun should not be
permitted to proceed with the purchase from a
federally licensed gun dealer. A separate Federal law
makes it a crime for felons, fugitives, drug users and
some other categories of people to buy guns.
According to Federal statistics, the law has been
quite effective, leading to the rejection of some 6,600
gun purchase applications a month.
The National Rifle Association has financed legal
challenges to the law around the country, with mixed
results. The case before the Court today was an appeal
by two sheriffs, Jay Printz of Ravalli County, Mont.,
and Richard Mack of Graham County, Ariz., who
challenged the law successfully in separate Federal
District Court lawsuits. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in San Francisco, then
heard the Government's appeal and upheld the law in
a 1995 ruling.
For the Brady law itself, the impact of the ruling
today may be somewhat limited. The background
check provision was scheduled to expire in November
1998, to be replaced by a Federal record-checking
system to be used by the gun dealers themselves.
Representative Charles E. Schumer, the Brooklyn
Democrat who was the Brady law's original sponsor,
said today that he would introduce a bill to make it
illegal in the interim for gun dealers to sell a gun
unless they first find a sheriff, either in their own
jurisdiction or elsewhere, who will conduct a
background check on the would-be purchaser. "We
will not allow a handful of rogue sheriffs to undermine
or weaken the Brady law," he said.
In an interview, Mr. Schumer said that beyond the
fate of the Brady law, the decision today had "huge
implications" for federalism, undermining the basis for
much modern Federal legislation. "If you take the
Scalia opinion to its logical extreme, you could go back
to the 1890's," he said.
Federal laws now require states to administer some
Federal labor and environmental programs. Bills
pending in Congress to require states to give utility
consumers access to alternative retail suppliers could
possibly run afoul of the Court's analysis today.
Most Federal mandates on the states will not be
affected by the ruling because they have at least
theoretically been accepted voluntarily by states as
inducements for eligibility for various Federal grants,
such as money for highways or schools.
The opinions reflected very different views of the
intentions and trustworthiness of Congress, with
Justice Scalia's the more cynical. "By forcing state
governments to absorb the financial burden of
implementing a Federal regulatory program," he said,
"members of Congress can take credit for 'solving'
problems without having to ask their constituents to
pay for the solutions with higher Federal taxes," and at
the same time can make sure that local officials "will
be blamed for any error" in how the program works.
Justice Stevens, by contrast, said the Court should
rely on Congress to make the political judgments on
what to require of the states. Given the political
accountability of members of Congress to the
electorate, he said, "it is quite unrealistic to assume
that they will ignore the sovereignty concerns of their
constituents." He added, "It is far more reasonable to
presume that their decisions to impose modest burdens
on state officials from time to time reflect a considered
judgment that the people in each of the states will
benefit therefrom."
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The courtroom was surprisingly empty for the final
day of the term, perhaps because members of the
Washington bar, knowing that only the Brady law case
was due for decision, decided not to come. But the
tourists, the Court staff and Administration lawyers
who showed up were treated to a riveting and unusual
display as Justice Scalia summarized his opinion and
Justice Stevens responded.
Side by side the two Justices sat, the bearded,
dark-haired Justice Scalia, youthful at 61, and the
grandfatherly Justice Stevens, at 75 the Court's oldest
member, both men deeply committed to opposing
visions of the constitutional structure they have
devoted their professional lives to interpreting.
Justice Stevens at times read from a memorandum
that contained excerpts from his dissenting opinion.
But often he spoke off the cuff, looking directly at the
small audience as he explained his disagreement.
He made some sly points that his written opinion
omitted. For example, he said that in its lack of textual
support in the Constitution itself, the majority opinion
reminded him of an opinion by Justice William 0.
Douglas that extrapolated a right to privacy from the
Constitution's "emanations" and "penumbras." That
opinion, in Griswold v. Connecticut, has been
denounced for 30 years by judicial conservatives as the
height of judicial activism.
The debate today over Supreme Court precedent
centered on a 1992 decision, New York v. United
States, in which the Court declared unconstitutional a
law that required states to handle their low-level
radioactive waste. In effect, the Court said then, this
law impermissibly required states to pass legislation.
In support of the Brady law, the Government and the
dissenters today argued that the holding of New York
v. United States was inapplicable because the
background-check provision required nothing so out of
the ordinary of local law-enforcement officers. Justice
Scalia's opinion said this distinction was "interesting"
but not persuasive.
There were several separate concurring and
dissenting opinions today. One of the more interesting
was by Justice Thomas, who said that given the Second
Amendment's reference to "the right of the people to
keep and bear Arms," he doubted whether Congress
had the power to regulate intrastate gun sales at all.
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COURT VOIDS BACKGROUND CHECK OF GUN BUYER UNDER BRADY LAW
The Washington Post
Saturday, June 28, 1997
Joan Biskupic
The Supreme Court yesterday struck down a key
portion of the Brady gun control law, ruling 5 to 4 that
Congress overstepped its powers by trying to
commandeer the resources of states to carry out federal
law.
Issued on the last day of a tumultuous term, the
decision imposed another restriction on the power of the
federal government, a recurring theme of the court's
rulings in recent years.
Voting 5 to 4, the high court invalidated a provision
requiring local sheriffs to check the backgrounds of gun
buyers, part of a broader law inspired by James S.
Brady, who was disabled in the 1981 assassination
attempt on President Ronald Reagan. The law marked
the first major effort by Congress to regulate firearms in
two decades, and passed in 1993 after seven years of
fractious debate.
"Congress cannot compel the states to enact or enforce
a federal regulatory program," Justice Antonin Scalia
wrote for the court, relying on an important 1992
precedent but also narrowly reading the Constitution's
grant of congressional powers.
In dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens read aloud for
nearly 20 minutes his statement protesting the majority.
If Congress believes the Brady Act "will benefit the
people of the nation we should respect both its
policy judgment and its appraisal of its constitutional
power," he said. The decision is likely to have limited
impact on gun control; most states already require
background checks and the federal government is
developing a nationwide screening system to do the
work that currently is left to local law enforcement. But
it holds great significance for how Congress writes laws
affecting social policy.
Scores of federal laws affecting everything from the
environment to transportation require the states to carry
them out. And as long as the statutes are rooted in
specific provisions of the Constitution, yesterday's
ruling would not affect them.
A federal law that conditions highway funds on states
enacting certain public safety measures, for example,
would be within Congress's powers because of a
provision in the spending clause of the Constitution that
gives Washington the authority to control federal
money.
Similarly, the Constitution's interstate commerce
clause gives Congress the authority to regulate activities
that occur across state lines, a provision often used to
draft environmental, anti-discrimination and public
safety regulations.
Yesterday's ruling sends the message that if federal
lawmakers are going to get involved in state activities,
they must do so carefully. Indeed, Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor said in a concurring statement that the ruling
does not foreclose a congressional attempt to achieve
some of the same goals of the Brady Act, just through
different means.
"Congress is . . free to amend the . program to
provide for its continuance on a contractual basis with
the states if it wishes, as it does with a number of other
federal programs," she said.
While in a practical way the rulings may only mean
that Congress has to pay more attention to how it writes
legislation, the decision nonetheless shows how ready
this court is to impose limits on the national
government.
Sen. Herb Kohl (D-Wis.), a sponsor of the Brady Act,
said he feared that the court's legal reasoning could
imperil laws requiring states to report missing children,
to get lead out of school drinking water and to publicly
disclose where hazardous waste is stored.
"Today's court ruling may make it impossible for
Congress to enlist the aid of states to address a broad
range of America's problems," Kohl said.
In the past five years, a close but decisive majority has
hemmed federal authority and enhanced state powers,
by bolstering the 10th Amendment's guarantee of state
sovereignty, by limiting congressional power to regulate
interstate commerce and by broadly interpreting the
11th Amendment, protecting states from lawsuits to
enforce federal rights.
Earlier this week, as the justices were winding down
their term, they invalidated a federal law intended to
protect religious practices from government
interference. The justices said Congress had co-opted
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the court's power to decide constitutional protection for
religion and intruded on the business of the states.
"Constitutional federalism thrives in the Supreme
Court," said Jesse Choper, a law professor at the
University of California at Berkeley, referring to the
diminished federal authority left after the high court
term. "This is a majority with a very different vision of
the limits of national power and they're willing to
enforce those limits."
The country's tradition, most notably since the New
Deal era, has been to shore up national government at
the expense of the states. But today's court, led by Chief
Justice William H. Rehnquist, has been reversing the
trend. He has had the consistent support of four other
justices: O'Connor, Scalia and Justices Anthony M.
Kennedy and Clarence Thomas. Those five faced off
against the usual dissenters: Stevens and Justices David
H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer.
In Scalia's opinion yesterday, he emphasized the dual
and concurrent power of the state and federal
governments and, in recounting America's
constitutional tradition, narrowly construed federal
authority.
"It is an essential attribute of the states' retained
sovereignty that they remain independent and
autonomous . . . ," Scalia said. "It is no more
compatible with this independence and autonomy that
their [police] officers be dragooned into administering
federal law than it would be compatible with the
independence and autonomy of the United States that
its officers be impressed into service for the execution
of state laws."
Intended to cut down on handgun violence, the Brady
law requires gun dealers to give a local sheriff the name
of a would-be buyer, then wait five business days to
hear back on the person's background. During that
time, the sheriff is supposed to check state, local and
national crime records, and inform the dealer if the
potential buyer is a convicted felon or otherwise would
be barred from purchasing a handgun. It is that last
provision that was invalidated in yesterday's twin cases.
Montana Sheriff Jay Printz and Arizona Sheriff
Richard Mack had challenged the background check,
saying it was time consuming and distracted their
deputies from enforcing local laws. The sheriffs said
states should be protected from such legislative
intrusions by the 10th Amendment, which says that
constitutional powers not given to the federal
government, nor explicitly removed from the states'
domain, are reserved for the states and the people.
The sheriffs relied on a 1992 ruling in New York v.
United States that said Congress may not force states to
enact or run a federal program. In that ruling, the court
struck down part of a federal law intended to make
states responsible for the low-level radioactive waste
they generate by drafting local legislation.
The 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the
sheriffs' claim and upheld the Brady law.
Overturning that lower court decision yesterday, the
Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding in the 1992 case.
But it went further by saying that Congress cannot
commandeer state officers into acting on its behalf.
"By forcing state governments to absorb the financial
burden of implementing a federal regulatory program,"
Scalia wrote, "members of Congress can take credit for
'solving' problems without having to ask their
constituents to pay for the solutions with higher federal
taxes."
Overall, the majority said that if the text and history of
the Constitution fail to explicitly provide for
congressional power in a particular area, courts should
presume federal lawmakers don't have the power.
Dissenters said the court should look, rather, to see
whether anything in the Constitution explicitly denies
Congress the power.
Wrote Stevens, "There is not a clause, sentence, or
paragraph in the entire text of the Constitution of the
United States that supports the proposition that a local
police officer can ignore a command contained in a
statute enacted by Congress pursuant to an express
delegation of power enumerated in Article I."
Copyright 1997, The Washington Post
334
ABROAD AT HOME; JUSTICES ON A MISSION
The New York Times
June 30, 1997
Anthony Lewis
In the 1930's willful members of the Supreme Court
used strained and rigid readings of the Constitution to
strike down New Deal legislation as beyond Federal
power. For a time they crippled the Government's
ability to cope with the national Depression, and they
did great damage to the institution of the Court.
To the generations that followed, it seemed
inconceivable that the Court would ever go down that
path again. But today a bare majority, led by justices on
a mission to roll back history, is once more inventing
doctrines to make the United States less of a nation.
That is the meaning of the Court's most important
constitutional decision of the term just ended, the case
striking down parts of the Brady gun law. By a vote of
5 to 4 the Court held that Congress's power to regulate
commerce, including traffic in guns, did not allow it to
enlist local law enforcement officers to carry out checks
on people buying handguns.
Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the majority of
five, conceded that there was nothing in the actual text
of the Constitution ruling out the use of state officials to
carry out Federal policy. But he found an absolute rule
against it implicit in history and "the structure of the
Constitution."
It was a strange opinion. It had no magisterial
statement of principle, of the kind to be expected when
the Supreme Court takes the rare step of invalidating an
act of Congress. The tone was defensive, much of the
opinion spent trying to answer dissents by Justices John
Paul Stevens and David Souter.
Justice Stevens, for example, pointed out that the
earliest Congresses gave a number of duties to state
officials. They directed state judges and court clerks to
handle citizenship matters, and to have committees
inspect vessels for seaworthiness. Justice Scalia argued
that those were judicial matters and proved nothing
about "executive" functions.
In the Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton and
James Madison spoke of the Federal Government using
state officers to help carry out its laws. Justice Scalia
tried, unconvincingly, to explain away that authoritative
view.
What mattered to Justice Scalia was evidently the
result, not the reasoning. And therein lies an irony.
In Chief Justice Earl Warren's day some legal
scholars criticized a number of the Supreme Court's
decisions as "result oriented." That is, the critics
charged, the majority was determined to reach a certain
result - liberal in those days -- and did so regardless of
precedent or constitutional doctrine.
Today it is Justice Scalia and his conservative
colleagues who fit the result-oriented mold. Chief
Justice William Rehnquist and Justice Clarence Thomas
are with him in using every imaginable opportunity to
cut down the power of the Federal Government.
Sometimes, as in the Brady law case, they attract
Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Anthony Kennedy
to make a majority.
Their abstract, formalistic approach overlooks
realities. One, for instance, is that Congress is very
sensitive to state interests, and in the Brady law it
imposed a modest duty on local officers. Justice Stevens
said, compellingly: "Unelected judges are better off
leaving the protection of federalism to the political
process in all but the most extraordinary
circumstances."
The Constitution is not a collection of absolutes; if it
were, it would have failed long ago. Our history shows
that American federalism involves a degree of
cooperation and overlapping between state and Federal
powers, just as the separation of powers among the
branches of the Federal Government has never been
absolute.
Justice Stephen Breyer, in a separate dissent, asked
why "the creation of a new Federal gun-law
bureaucracy . . . would better promote either state
sovereignty or individual liberty." But the majority,
intent on absolutes, was uninterested in such practical
realities.
Justice O'Connor filed a two-paragraph opinion trying
to take some of the sting out of her part in the
judgment. State officers may voluntarily continue
taking part in Brady law enforcement, she noted, and in
any event their role is an interim one. But this decision
was not limited to the Brady law. It set out to cabin and
confine the Government of the United States. And so it
will do until, as I believe, another Supreme Court sends
it to join the discarded relics of the 1930's.
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In blasting a hole through the heart of the Brady gun-control law Friday, the conservative justices of the U.S.
Supreme Court made their strongest statement yet against forcing states to implement federal laws, and may have
given new ammunition to state challenges of federal environmental rules.
"Federal commandeering of state governments is such a novel phenomenon that this court's first experience with
it did not occur until the 1970s," Justice Antonin Scalia wrote for the 5-4 majority. "When we were at last
confronted with a federal statute that unambiguously required the states to enact or administer a federal regulatory
program, our decision should have come as no surprise."
Scalia, joined by Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justices Anthony Kennedy, Sandra Day O'Connor and
Clarence Thomas, said that the federal government cannot order local police to conduct background checks on
would-be handgun buyers.
Constitutional scholars said the rulings Friday in Printz v. U.S. and Mack v. U.S., 97 C.D.O.S. 5096, fell in line
with the court's recent decisions, but went one step further.
"It's an important opinion because it puts the Tenth Amendment on a firmer foundation," said McGeorge School
of Law professor J. Clark Kelso, referring to the amendment that established the states' sovereignty. "This ruling
puts a stop to any other legislation that might attempt to enlist states in federal programs absent the traditional
trade-off of funds."
Eugene Volokh, a constitutional law professor at UCLA, called the decision a " strong symbolic statement" but
said he doubts it will trigger any realignment in the balance of state and federal powers.
Indeed, Kelso and Volokh both questioned whether the ruling will resonate much beyond the Brady law in light
of the other means Congress still has available to pressure states to do its bidding.
"The federal government is still empowered to contract out to state governments," Volokh said, "and in many
cases the states are happy to take care of those functions."
In addition, the scholars said that Congress can - and does -- coerce states into complying with federal programs
by holding grant funds hostage until the states cooperate.
"Like the government did with state highway funds, Congress can dangle enough money over the states to
encourage them to participate that ultimately it's an offer the states can't refuse," Kelso said.
USC law professor Erwin Chemerinsky acknowledged that Congress has "broad latitude" to put strings on grants.
But he said he still fears that Friday's ruling will spawn a series of challenges to federal environmental laws that
mandate state cooperation.
"I think this case together with a few others this decade indicate that the court is going to use federalism as a
limit on federal power," Chemerinsky said. "I think it's very undesirable, and makes a lot of environmental laws
now clearly vulnerable."
Friday's 5-4 ruling, which concluded the court's 1996-97 term, appeared to leave intact a required waiting period
of up to five days before someone can buy a handgun. There would be no requirement for police to check a
prospective purchaser's background during that period, however.
The ruling does not affect states such as California that have their own mandatory waiting periods before
handgun purchases. California's is 10 days.
Dissentiiig Justice John Paul Stevens wrote that the background-check requirement is more comparable to a
statute requiring local police officers to report the identity of missing children to the Crime Control Center of the
Department of Justice than to an offensive federal command to a sovereign state.
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SUPREME COURT RULING GIVES NEEDED
BOOST TO THE 10TH AMENDMENT
Los Angeles Daily News
Tuesday, July 8, 1997
Editorial
Gary M. Galles
THE Supreme Court has ruled the Brady law's
requirement that local police conduct background
checks on handgun buyers unconstitutional.
Writing for the 5-4 majority, Justice Antonin Scalia
ruled that the 10th Amendment prevents Washington
from overstepping its enumerated constitutional powers
by conscripting state and local government officials to
enforce federal regulations.
In a vigorous dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens
argued that such a federal power does derive from
Article I, Section 8's commerce clause ("The Congress
shall have the power to . regulate Commerce .
among the several states").
Scalia's majority decision on the Brady law represents
an important step toward reasserting the importance of
the 10' Amendment's restriction of federal powers to
those listed in the Constitution.
At the same time, Stevens' dissent makes it clear that
such a ruling requires that the commerce clause must be
restricted in its scope, for a broad-enough reading of its
meaning makes everything part of the federal
government's enumerated powers, and the commerce
clause "trumps" the 10th Amendment.
This is important because, in the past century, just
such an expansive view of the commerce clause has
been the main weapon used to almost completely
eliminate the 10th Amendment's restriction of federal
government powers to those specified in the
Constitution (which is why it is commonly called the
"everything clause" in law school, since it is the sole
hook upon which virtually all federal regulatory actions
and agencies find their constitutional justification).
The result has been to federalize almost every issue in
the country, something drastically at odds with the
clearly stated intent of the clause when it was written.
Only by "shrinking" the commerce clause back to its
original meaning can the 10th Amendment be revived,
and with it, the form of federalism designed in the
Constitution.
The Constitution included the commerce clause
because under the Articles of Confederation, states were
imposing duties on goods shipped from other states,
thus funding benefits for their citizens from the pockets
of other states' citizens. It was designed to put an end to
this extortion of interstate trade, making the United
States the world's largest free-trade zone (and was thus
greatly responsible for America's ensuing economic
success).
'Regulate' being misused
As The Federalist makes clear, the commerce clause
was intended to take this issue out of state hands by
allowing only Congress to regulate interstate commerce
(with "regulate" taking its then-current meaning of "to
make regular or remove impediments") but not to create
an extensive federal power to control the minutiae of
economic life (following regulate's more recent
meaning of "to tell others what to do").
In modem language, its meaning is better understood
as, "No state shall have the power to interfere in
commerce with other states."
In Federalist 11, Alexander Hamilton indicated the
commerce clause's intent was that of a "prohibitory
regulation, extending ... throughout the states," warning
that without such restrictions on states, "this intercourse
would be fettered, interrupted and narrowed by a
multiplicity of causes."
In Federalist 42, James Madison described the main
purpose of the clause as "the relief of the States which
import and export through other States, from the
improper contributions levied on them by the latter." He
wrote not of activist federal regulation of commerce, but
rather of "restraints imposed on the authority of the
States," citing Switzerland, where "each Canton is
obliged to allow to merchandises, a passage through its
jurisdiction . . without an augmentation of the tolls,"
as his main illustration.
The narrow intended scope of the commerce clause is
cemented by Madison, in Federalist 45: "The powers
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delegated by the proposed Constitution to the Federal
Government are few and defined. . The powers
reserved to the several States will extend to all the
objects, which, m the ordinary course of affairs, concern
the lives, liberties, and prosperities of the people; and
the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the
State."
It was this stringent constraint on the federal power
being given that made the clause one "which few
oppose, and from which no apprehensions are
entertained."
How did we get from a clause understood as a ban on
state restrictions of trade to one understood as an open
invitation to virtually any federal dictate? Through
Supreme Court interpretations that not only changed
the meaning of "regulate" but progressively expanded
the meaning of "commerce."
Commerce clause abused
Until the Interstate Commerce Act in 1887, the
commerce clause was only used to overturn state
restrictions on interstate commerce. But then it began
to be abused to justify active congressional regulation of
commerce. Since then, The Federalist's ideas have been
further undermined, with the modern deathblow
coming in Wickard vs. Filburn in 1942.
In that case, Justice Robert Jackson's opinion
mushroomed the scope of the commerce clause to
include federal power to ban farmers from growing
wheat for their own consumption. "Even if appellee's
activities be local and though it may not be regarded as
commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached
by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on
interstate commerce." That is, the federal power to
regulate interstate commerce extended to banning (not
just regulating) production (not commerce) occurring in
a single state (not among states).
Anything judged to have a substantial effect, including
any "practices affecting prices" - that is, any business
practice - became fair game for federal regulators. The
unhappy results we see in the regulatory agencies that
now engulf us.
If the Supreme Court upholds and extends precedents
such as Wickard vs. Filburn, there will be no end to
onerous federal intervention in state decisions. But the
Brady ruling, as well as 1994's Lopez decision that a
federal ban on guns in school zones was
unconstitutional because it was not sufficiently related
to commerce to justify federal intervention, provides
hope that by starting to reduce the commerce clause
back to its original meaning, the 10th Amendment will
be taken seriously again.
And the alternative is unappealing. As Chief Justice
William Rehnquist responded to claims of expansive
federal powers under the commerce clause in Lopez, "If
we were to accept the government's arguments, we are
hard pressed to posit any activity by an individual that
Congress is without power to regulate."
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COURT, 9-0, UPHOLDS STATE LAWS PROHIBITING ASSISTED SUICIDE
The New York Times
June 27, 1997
Linda Greenhouse
Stepping for the first time into the wrenching political
and moral debate over doctor-assisted suicide, the
Supreme Court ruled today that states may continue to
ban the practice but at the same time suggested that the
door remained open to constitutional claims for
assistance by dying patients in the future.
In a pair of 9-to-O decisions, the Court rejected
constitutional challenges to laws in New York and
Washington that made doctor-assisted suicide a crime.
But the Court's tone was that of a tentative first step
rather than a definitive final ruling on the issue.
In concurring opinions that accounted for a majority
of the Court, various Justices suggested that at least
some terminally ill people in intractable pain might be
able to claim in the future that they had a constitutional
right to a doctor's assistance in hastening their deaths.
"Our opinion does not absolutely foreclose such a
claim," Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist said in the
Court's principal opinion, which was signed by four
other Justices.
One of those four, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, said
that while she agreed there was "no generalized right to
'commit suicide,' " she viewed as still open the question
of whether "a mentally competent person who is
experiencing great suffering" that cannot otherwise be
controlled has a constitutionally based "interest in
controlling the circumstances of his or her imminent
death."
The decisions came amid a torrent of other rulings
from the Court in the final week of its 1996-97 term, in
which the Justices also invalidated a Federal law
banning indecent speech on the Internet and dismissed
a challenge to the line-item veto, the President's power
to kill individual items of spending in bills that he signs
into law.
The session is now expected to end on Friday with a
ruling in a states' rights challenge to the Brady gun
control law.
The inconclusive nature of the ruling on
doctor-assisted suicide was perhaps the most surprising
aspect of a decision that was widely seen, in its bottom
line, as a foregone conclusion. The Court was never
likely to embrace the expansive views of due process or
equal protection taken by the two Federal appeals courts
whose decisions were reversed today. The lower courts
had declared New York's and Washington's criminal
prohibitions against assisted suicide to be
unconstitutional.
Throughout the opinions today, the Court's tone was
measured and sober, in contrast to the sharp language
that sometimes pervades the Court's constitutional
debates. The Court seemed to be inviting further
developments. Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that
"throughout the nation, Americans are engaged in
earnest and profound debate about the morality, legality
and practicality of physician-assisted suicide." He said
the Court's approach "permits this debate to continue,
as it should in a democratic society."
Although the Court did not address the question
directly, there was at least a strong suggestion in Chief
Justice Rehnquist's opinion, as well as an explicit
discussion in a concurring opinion by Justice David H.
Souter, that states were free to experiment and permit
doctor-assisted suicide if they chose to do so. The Court
should "stay its hand to allow reasonable legislative
consideration," Justice Souter said.
Only one state, Oregon, has voted to permit
doctor-assisted suicide, in a referendum that has yet to
go into effect because of prolonged court challenges.
The Justices have been asked by opponents of the
measure to hear a challenge to its constitutionality, but
that case will not come up for consideration until the
Court's next term. Meanwhile, the Oregon Legislature
decided to put the question to voters again, in
November
One reason for the somewhat inconclusive outcome
today was the way in which Chief Justice Rehnquist
structured his opinion in the Washington State case,
which dealt with the question of whether a right to
doctor-assisted suicide should be recognized as an
aspect of the "liberty" protected by the 14th
Amendment's guarantee of due process.
The Chief Justice essentially reframed the question
that five doctors had raised when they brought their
lawsuit on behalf of three dying patients. The question,
as the lower court interpreted it, was whether mentally
competent, terminally ill adults had a right to a doctor's
assistance in determining the time and manner of their
death.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, in San Francisco, answered yes in a 1996
opinion that drew on the Court's constitutional
precedents on the right to abortion and the right to
reject unwanted life-sustaining treatment.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, however, put the question in
the case on a higher level of generality: "Whether the
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protections of the due process clause include a right to
commit suicide with another's assistance." The answer
to that question was no, he said, given several factors
that he said were relevant: a 700-year history of
disapproval of suicide and assisted suicide in the
Anglo-American legal tradition; "the considered policy
choice of almost every state," and strong state interests
in protecting vulnerable people and avoiding the "path
to voluntary and perhaps even involuntary euthanasia."
In their concurring separate opinions other Justices
objected to the Chief Justice's formulation of the
question. Justice Stephen G. Breyer said the Court
should have considered a different way of describing the
question, one "for which our legal tradition may provide
greater support." He said: "That formulation would use
words roughly like a 'right to die with dignity.' But
irrespective of the exact words used, at its core would
lie personal control over the manner of death,
professional medical assistance, and the avoidance of
unnecessary and severe physical suffering -- combined."
Justice Brever said there was no need to decide in this
case whether a right described in that way was
protected by the Constitution because in both New York
and Washington, doctors are permitted to prescribe
pain-killing drugs, even in potentially lethal doses, so
that "the laws before us do not force a dying person to
undergo that kind of pain."
In a separate opinion, Justice John Paul Stevens said
he viewed the decision today as being in much the same
posture as the Court's decisions that upheld the death
penalty 20 years ago. "Just as our conclusion that
capital punishment is not always unconstitutional did
not preclude later decisions holding that it is sometimes
impermissibly cruel," Justice Stevens said, "so is it
equally clear that a decision upholding a general
statutory prohibition of assisted suicide does not mean
that every possible application of the statute would be
valid." He said there were "situations in which an
interest in hastening death is legitimate" and "entitled
to constitutional protection."
Justice Stevens said he did not agree with the appeals
court that there was a categorical right involved, but
said he recognized "the possibility that an individual
plaintiff seeking to hasten her death, or a doctor whose
assistance was sought, could prevail in a more
particularized challenge."
It was this assertion that Chief Justice Rehnquist
acknowledged in his opinion, at the same time adding
that "such a claim would have to be quite different"
from ones involved in this case. He did not elaborate.
In both the Washington case, Washington v.
Glucksberg, No. 96-110, and the New York case, Vacco
v. Quill, No. 95-1858, the Chief Justice's opinions for
the Court were joined by Justices O'Connor, Antonin
Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, and Clarence Thomas. In
addition to the separate opinions by Justices O'Connor,
Stevens, Souter and Breyer, Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg indicated in a brief statement that she agreed
with Justice O'Connor's approach.
In the New York case, which also began as a lawsuit
by doctors and terminally ill patients, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Manhattan,
took a different approach to striking down the New
York law. The appeals court said that because New
York permitted terminally ill patients to hasten their
death by ordering withdrawal of life-sustaining medical
treatment, the prohibition against doctor-assisted
suicide violated the rights of other dying patients who
were not dependent on particular equipment or
treatment.
In his opinion overturning this decision, Chief Justice
Rehnquist said that "unlike the Court of Appeals, we
think the distinction between assisting suicide and
withdrawing life-sustaining treatment, a distinction
widely recognized and endorsed in the medical
profession and in our legal traditions, is both important
and logical." He added: "It is certainly rational." The
Chief Justice was the author of the Court's decision in
1990, in Cruzan v. Missouri Department of Health, that
for the first time recognized a right to forgo unwanted
treatment. As with the decisions today, the Cruzan
decision left important issues unsettled and divisions
within the Court unresolved.
The dispute over the Cruzan decision flared up again
in a very telling way today in an oblique debate between
the Chief Justice, who said the decision was based on
little more than the common-law rule that "forced
medication was a battery," and Justice Stevens, who
interpreted the decision as a much more affirmative
recognition of a "more basic concept of freedom that is
even older than the common law."
Justice Stevens said the right recognized in the 1990
decision, which concerned a young woman being kept
alive in a persistent vegetative state, was "not merely a
person's right to refuse a particular kind of unwanted
treatment, but also her interest in dignity, and in
determining the character of the memories that will
survive long after her death."
Reaction to the rulings today was voluminous,
reflecting the intense interest the cases had generated.
More than 60 briefs were filed, a near record for the
Court. Among those expressing satisfaction with the
decision was President Clinton, who opposes assisted
suicide and who recently signed into law a prohibition
against using any Federal money, including Medicaid
money, to pay for doctor-assisted suicide.
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WASHINGTON HAD A HAND IN 2 RULINGS REAFFIRMING STATES' RIGHTS
The News Tribune Tacoma, WA
Wednesday, July 2, 1997
Editorial
JOHN CARLSON; News Tribune columnist
It wasn't obvious at first glance, but the voters and
lawmakers of Washington state played a vitally
important role in two momentous Supreme Court
decisions last week that showed a renewed reluctance
by the nation's highest court to intrude on the process of
democracy at the state level. Both cases touched on
issues that are deeply divisive and controversial. In
Washington v. Glucksberg, a unanimous court reversed
a lower court ru ling that struck down this state's ban on
doctor-assisted suicide.
"The history of the law's treatment of assisted suicide
in this country has been and continues to be one of the
rejection of nearly all efforts to permit it. That being the
case, our decisions lead us to conclude that the asserted
'right' to assistance in committing suicide is not a
fundamental liberty interest protected by the
due-process clause," wrote Chief Justice William
Rehnquist. Rehnquist, interestingly, lost his wife to
cancer after a prolonged battle with the disease six
years ago.
This court battle had its roots in Initiative 119, the
"death with dignity" ballot measure that appeared on
the ballot here in 1991. The measure would have
radically expanded the law to allow doctors to help
patients diagnosed with a terminal illness kill
themselves. The state's voters, convinced that the
measure simply went too far with insufficient
safeguards, voted it down by a clear but by no means
massive majority.
An attentive Legislature decided to revisit the issue the
following year to strike a sensible balance between
supporters and opponents of the initiative. Accordingly,
state law was changed after long, vigorous and
occasionally emotional debate, to allow doctors in some
circumstances to allow the withdrawal of artificially
administered food and water to the terminally ill facing
imminent death.
A snapshot of democracy in action? Absolutely. But
the proponents of 119 weren't satisfied. They went to
court to see if some judges would void the democratic
process and simply declare their demand for assisted
suicide a "constitutional right." Sure enough, the 9th
Circuit Court of Appeals, upholding a federal judge
from Seattle, essentially argued that if people can
terminate life in the womb by abortion, then they also
have the right to terminate their own life. The ruling
essentially rendered the meaning of life to be relative:
"There is a constitutionally protected liberty interest in
determining the time and manner of one's own death,"
wrote Judge Stephen Reinhardt for the majority.
In reversing the appeals court ruling, the Supreme
Court made it clear that such delicate issues with
potentially explosive side effects should be decided by
elected representatives, not federal judges. Even the
Supreme Court's liberal justices appointed by Bill
Clinton signed on to an opinion endorsing the
sentiments of Justice Louis Brandeis: "The ...
challenging task of crafting appropriate procedures for
safeguarding liberty interests is entrusted to the
'laboratory' of the states in the first instance."
This attitude shows a clear shift from judges
substituting their own reflections on the law for those of
the voters and the people they elect to represent them.
It also shows a reluctance to embrace the logic on
which the Roe v. Wade decision was made that struck
down all state statutes regulating or prohibiting
abortion a generation ago.
The high court's second opinion narrowly upheld (5-4)
a Kansas law virtually copied from a Washington state
statute that allows the indefinite commitment of
dangerous, mentally abnormal sex offenders. State Rep.
Ida Ballasiotes (R-Mercer Island), who was
instrumental in getting Washington's law passed after
her own daughter was murdered by a convicted sex
offender, mailed a copy of our law to a Kansas couple
who suffered a similar tragedy several years ago. That
is how Kansas came to adopt the law that was being
challenged for being unfair to sex offenders who had
already served their sentences.
The court, noting that a separate civil hearing is
required to keep the offenders locked up, ruled 5-4 for
the state of Kansas. That ruling made moot federal
Judge John Coughenour's decision against the
Washington law. The 51 sexual psychopaths at
Monroe's Special Offender Unit will stay put.
On the eve of our nation's 221st birthday, we should
appreciate the connection the high court made between
constitutional liberty and the restraint the justices
placed on their own branch of government. A free
republic truly flourishes not only when the branches of
government check and balance each other's power, but
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The most striking - and welcome - aspect of the U.S. Supreme Court's unanimous ruling on physician-assisted
suicide was its approach to handling the matter.
All the justices agreed that there is no general constitutional right to assisted suicide. (Although there were
suggestions that there might possibly be a limited right in extremely restricted circumstances.)
This main ruling meant that the justices had collectively resisted efforts to have them discover a new "right" that
is nowhere mentioned in the U.S. Constitution. They also wisely resisted inferring such a right from the
"due-process" or the "equal-protection" clauses of the 14th Amendment. Federal appeals courts had cited these
clauses in overturning laws banning assisted suicide in the states of New York and Washington; the Supreme Court,
ruling in Vacco v. Quill and Washington v. Glucksberg, has thereby reinstated those state laws.
On the other hand, the justices wisely refrained from ruling that physician-assisted suicide is barred under the
Constitution.
All of which was a healthy example of judicial self-restraint: When the Constitution provides no reasonably clear
direction on an issue, the justices should not try, as too often happens, to supply an answer based on their own
personal views. This takes them beyond their legitimate function - interpreting the Constitution as it stands - and
puts them in the business of usurping authority by writing their own Constitution as they would prefer it to be.
Instead, in those circumstances, the people should make the decisions. Acting through their elected
representatives, they can, as appropriate, pass either a law or a constitutional amendment. Chief Justice William
Rehnquist put the matter this way:
"Throughout the nation, Americans are engaged in an earnest and profound debate about the morality, legality
and practicality of physician-assisted suicide. Our holding permits this debate to continue, as it should in a
democratic society."
In principle, physician-assisted suicide is now barred in virtually all states. Only one state, Oregon, has a law that
expressly permits physician-assisted suicide, and that law - approved by voter initiative in 1994 - has been
entangled in legal controversies.
As for the future, the issue of physician-assisted suicide will be resolved, one way or the other, by the people
themselves, without having their deliberations prematurely and artificially cut off by judicial edicts.
Physician-assisted suicide is a complex issue. It will be difficult enough to handle it suitably by statutes, which
can be modified to accommodate clinical experiences and technological changes; it would be far more difficult to
handle the issue by relying on general, and essentially unchallengeable, constitutional edicts imposed by courts.





The Wall Street Journal
Wednesday, July 2, 1997
Michael W. McConnell
Last week's assisted suicide decision reflects the U.S.
Supreme Court's restored commitment to decentralized
democracy. Rather than attempting to impose its own
nationwide solution to difficult and contentious
questions of moral and social policy (as it did in the
abortion cases), the court seems to have realized that in
the absence of clear direction in our constitutional text
or history, it is better to allow the people and their
elected representatives to wrestle with these problems.
This reflects a return to humility, after several
decades in which the court seemed to view its job as
second-guessing the wisdom of democratic judgments.
Last week the justices expressly recognized that other
institutions in our society often are better positioned to
resolve important issues of principle. The justices took
off the robes of the philosopher king and donned the
more humble garments of judges in a democratic
society -- deciding cases according to constitutional
norms established by the people over time, rather than
according to what they candidly called "the policy
preferences of the members of this Court."
Writing for a five-justice majority, Chief Justice
William Rehnquist explained that when the court
declares a new constitutional "right," it places the
matter "outside the arena of public debate and
legislative action." This is legitimate only when the
asserted right is based either on explicit constitutional
text or on the "history and tradition" of the nation.
This cautious approach ensures that constitutional law
is rooted in the will of the people and in principles that
have stood the test of time. By declining to find a right
to assisted suicide, the court does not purport to resolve
the question, but simply "permits this debate to
continue, as it should in a democratic society."
Although the court was unanimous in declining to
find a right to assisted suicide, four of the justices
wrote concurring opinions in which they said they
would reserve a larger role for judicial discretion. But
with the sole exception of Justice John Paul Stevens,
all expressed healthy skepticism about the competence
and legitimacy of the judiciary in making social policy.
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor (who joined the majority
opinion) made the telling observation that "every one
of us at some point may be affected by our own or a
family member's terminal illness," and thus there is
"no reason to think the democratic process will not
strike the proper balance." Judicial review is at its most
legitimate when the rights of a discrete minority (like
blacks in the Jim Crow South) are at stake. But when
the people of the states decided to restrict assisted
suicide, they were not imposing their will on a
minority. They were legislating for themselves and
their loved ones.
Justice David Souter emphasized that the case turned
on the relative "institutional competence" of
legislatures and courts. When the consequences of
recognizing a new right are unknown, legislatures
have the advantage both of superior fact finding and of
the ability to experiment. It seems the justices have
learned something from their experience with the
abortion cases.
The great institutional strength of courts is their
ability to enforce legal principles with consistency,
treating like cases alike regardless of the temper of the
times. But that virtue becomes a vice when principles
are in flux and the consequences of new approaches
are unpredictable. Constitutional judicial review is too
inflexible a process to deal with an issue like assisted
suicide.
There are four characteristics of the federal judiciary
that make it a poor -- and dangerous -- social-policy
maker. First, any answer imposed by the courts in the
name of the Constitution will apply across the nation.
Perhaps that makes sense when our national
experience points to a single answer. But on a novel
and complicated social question like the treatment of
the terminally ill, it would be foolhardy indeed for nine
people sitting in a courtroom in Washington, D.C., to
write the rules for everyone. There is no reason to
think that every state must have the same laws
pertaining to end-of-life decisions; and we can all learn
from the experience of states with different policies.
Second, constitutional decisions are difficult to
change, even when mistaken. The legitimacy of the
constitutional system depends on its stability: It strains
public credulity that the meaning of the Constitution
would change rapidly and often. By contrast,
legislatures can try new approaches, and then modify
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or abandon them in light of experience and criticism.
The state of Oregon has undertaken an experiment in
physician-assisted suicide that -- however misguided it
may appear to many of us -- will cast light on the
practical consequences. Other states may try other
approaches. To treat this social-policy question as one
of federal constitutional law would cut short this
process.
Third, because any lines drawn by courts must be
based on constitutional principle and not on prudential
compromise, it is difficult to limit a new right once it
has been recognized. The plaintiffs challenging the
New York assisted suicide law maintained that there is
no real difference between allowing patients to forgo
lifesaving medical treatment (which is allowed) and
allowing their doctors to prescribe affirmative
measures to bring about death (which is forbidden).
The court correctly held that the distinction between
killing and letting die is reasonable and legitimate. But
if it had gone the other way, where could it stop? On
what principled basis could the "right" be denied to
competent patients who face the prospect of extreme
pain not just for a few months but for many years?
How could assistance be limited to those physically
capable of administering the lethal poison to
themselves? Why limit the right to people in physical
pain? Why not those distressed at the prospect of the
loss of memory or mobility, or of a loved one? And
don't patients out of their minds with pain, or in a
coma, need this help more than anyone? (So much for
the requirement of voluntariness.) Once assisted
suicide is recognized as a constitutional right, it is
difficult to see how the right could be confined to a
narrow class of patients -- just as, once the right to
abortion was recognized, it proved difficult to limit it
in any serious way.
Fourth, the Supreme Court is the most
unrepresentative body in our governing structure. All
its members are from a single profession; they are
deliberately insulated from ordinary people. They
rarely have experience in the matters about which they
adjudicate. They are very busy (deciding around 100
cases every year), and have relatively little time for
study and reflection. They rely on arrogant kids just
out of law school for information, counsel and
assistance. By contrast, now that the question of
assisted suicide has been left to the states, a much
wider range of voices will be heard -- in churches and
synagogues, legislative halls, radio talk shows, hospital
ethics committees, jury rooms, learned journals and
less-learned ones, within healthy families and families
in pain. Sometimes, the best and most peaceful
solution to a contentious moral conflict is not to adopt
a sweeping principle and reject the other position, but
to construct a compromise that allows each side to
believe that society is responsive to its deeply held
convictions. Legislatures are good at that.
It takes a special kind of hubris for judges to think
they have the best answers to social problems about
which knowledgeable people of good will do not agree
and we have no national experience to guide us. Judge
Stephen Reinhardt of the Ninth Circuit U.S. Court of
Appeals, who announced the right to assisted suicide
last year and was reversed last week, described the
arguments of those who favor legal restrictions on
assisted suicide as "cruel," "untenable," "disingenuous
and fallacious," "meretricious," "ludicrous" and
"nihilist." He praised his court's own opinion as "more
enlightened." The Second Circuit declared there was
no "rational basis" for allowing refusal of
life-sustaining care but prohibiting assisted suicide --
never mind that this is the position of almost every
U.S. state and almost every nation in the world, as well
as professional associations of doctors, psychologists
and experts in the care of the elderly.
It is far from clear that federal judges are more
"enlightened" and "rational" than the rest of us. And
it is refreshing to see the Supreme Court exhibit the
humility that the lower courts so conspicuously lacked.
The court's majority says that "in every due process
case" where our constitutional text and history are
silent and our national experience provides no clear
answer, it intends to allow the democratic processes of
the 50 states to prevail. That will be a very great
improvement over the preceding decades of judicial
overreach.
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DEFENDING THE JUDICIARY;
HIGH COURT VOIDS A LAW EXPANDING RELIGIOUS RIGHTS
The New York Times
June 26, 1997
Linda Greenhouse
In one of its most important modem-day rulings on the
sources and limits of Congressional power, the Supreme
Court said today that Congress exceeded its authority when
it passed a law four years ago to give the practice of
religion more protection than the Court itself had found to
be constitutionally required.
The 6-to-3 decision to strike down the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act was a forceful reminder of
judicial power and a warning to the other branches of
Government not to trespass into the Court's domain.
"The power to interpret the Constitution in a case or
controversy remains in the judiciary," Justice Anthony M.
Kennedy said in his majority opinion, which was joined not
only by the Court's three most conservative members, Chief
Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia
and Clarence Thomas, but also by two of the most liberal
Justices, John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg.
Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, David H. Souter and
Stephen G. Breyer dissented.
The act, the product of the work of a broad coalition of
religious and civil liberties groups, passed unanimously in
the House of Representatives and attracted only three
negative votes in the Senate.
Supported by President Clinton and defended by his
administration in court, it provided that no level of
government could enforce laws that "substantially burden"
religious observance without demonstrating a "compelling"
need to do so and without using the "least restrictive means
available."
While the practical impact of today's decision - which
may be substantial - will be felt in the myriad ways that
religion and government interact, the case as the majority
approached it was not principally about religion. Rather,
this was the third major Supreme Court decision in as
many years, grounded in three separate lines of
constitutional analysis, to reject Congress's expansive
interpretation of its own powers and to take a generous
view of the role of the states in the Federal system.
Justice Kennedy said that by requiring "searching
judicial scrutiny" of any state law that had the effect of
making it more difficult for people to practice their
religion, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act was a
"considerable intrusion into the states' traditional
prerogatives and general authority to regulate for the health
and welfare of their citizens."
In the case before the Court today, a Catholic church in
the Texas city of Boeme, near San Antonio, had tried to
invoke the law to challenge the city's refusal to let it
enlarge its church building in a neighborhood zoned for
historic preservation. The city responded by challenging
the constitutionality of the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act.
A Federal District Judge in San Antonio declared the law
unconstitutional, but the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit, in New Orleans, reversed that
decision and upheld the law last year.
The law was passed in response to a 1990 Supreme
Court decision that rejected the "compelling interest" test,
which the Court had previously applied in some contexts.
The Court decision in rejecting the test held that there was
no religious exemption from laws that apply generally to
everyone and that were not passed to single out or
discriminate against religion.
That 5-to-4 decision, Employment Division v. Smith,
held that members of a Native American church who used
the illegal hallucinogen peyote in their religious rituals had
no constitutionally based exemption from Oregon's
narcotics laws.
While a constitutional ruling of the Supreme Court can
only be overturned by a constitutional amendment, and not
by ordinary legislation, supporters of the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act argued, in arguing for its
enactment in 1993, that they were not confronting the
Court directly but simply legislating a more protective
standard of review for laws affecting religion, a standard
the Court had deemed neither necessary nor forbidden.
As authority for the law, Congress invoked Section 5 of
the 14th Amendment, the source of much modem civil
rights legislation, which gives Congress the power to
"enforce, by appropriate legislation," the amendment's
guarantees of due process and equal protection. The
Supreme Court has interpreted the amendment's due
process guarantee to make the First Amendment, with its
guarantee of religious freedom, binding on the states.
That longstanding interpretation was not at issue today.
Rather, the question as the Court saw it was whether in
enacting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Congress
was "enforcing" the 14th Amendment or, by contrast, going
beyond that limited role to declare for itself the substantive
meaning of the amendment. It was in this respect that the
majority found Congress had gone too far.
"Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by
changing what the right is," Justice Kennedy said, adding,
"It has been given the power 'to enforce,' not the power to
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determine what constitutes a constitutional violation."
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Justice Kennedy
said, "cannot be considered remedial, preventive
legislation, if those terms are to have any meaning." He
said the law was "so out of proportion to a supposed
remedial or preventive object that it cannot be understood
as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional
behavior. It appears, instead, to attempt a substantive
change in constitutional protections."
Beyond the immediate context of the case, City of Boerne
v. Flores, the significance of the decision lay in how the
majority drew the line between "remedial" and
"substantive" actions to enforce the 14th Amendment. In
the past, Congress had not limited itself to a precise
tracking of the Court's constitutional rulings; for example,
in a series of laws dealing with voting rights in the 1960's,
Congress prohibited certain literacy tests even though the
Court had ruled that literacy tests were constitutional. The
Court, in turn, upheld the legislative prohibitions.
The Court reaffirmed the voting rights decisions today.
Justice Kennedy said that, properly understood, the laws at
issue in those decisions were responses to the "persisting
deprivation of constitutional rights resulting from this
country's history of racial discrimination." He added, "The
appropriateness of remedial measures must be considered
in light of the evil presented."
On the other hand, Justice Kennedy said, the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act reflected "a lack of
proportionality or congruence between the means adopted
and the legitimate end to be achieved." Describing the law
as "sweeping" and intrusive - "displacing laws and
prohibiting official actions of almost every description and
regardless of subject matter" - Justice Kennedy said it
placed burdens on the states that "far exceed any pattern or
practice of unconstitutional conduct" revealed in
Congressional hearings or elsewhere.
He said there was no evidence of "some widespread
pattern of religious discrimination in this country," but at
most evidence of "incidental burdens" such as the zoning
dispute in this case.
The Court's requirement that Congressional action under
the 14th amendment must demonstrate "proportionality or
congruence" to the problem Congress is addressing is a
new departure for the Court, which previously had left the
full extent of Congress's 14th Amendment powers
undefined. Some of the act's supporters said today the
Court had taken an unduly circumscribed view of
Congressional power.
Douglas Laycock, a University of Texas law professor
who helped draft the law and who argued the case at the
Court, said the ruling would invite new challenges to "all
the civil rights laws that apply to state and local
government." Mr. Laycock said the Court was asserting
"the power to unilaterally contract our liberties and to
deprive Congress of its power to protect those liberties."
Many members of the coalition behind the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act were more concerned today with
what they saw as the Court's minimizing of the religious
interests at stake, but calls by some groups for a
constitutional amendment met with, at best, a cautious
response.
The Rev. Oliver Thomas, special counsel to the National
Council of Churches and the chairman of the legislative
coalition, said in an interview that a constitutional
amendment should be "a last resort." He said the groups
would get together early next month to devise a strategy.
"Every religious person will be hurt by this decision,"
Mr. Thomas said. He said the Court misunderstood the
goal of the law, which was not to deter "a bunch of wicked
people" from discriminating against religion but to prevent
the "unintended consequences" of ordinary laws that make
religious observance difficult or impossible.
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act was widely
unpopular in the states, 16 of which filed a brief with the
Court recounting the sometimes fanciful religious claims
that prison inmates were making under the law.
The three dissenting Justices did not take issue with the
standard the Court applied today to Congressional action
under the 14th Amendment. Justice O'Connor, in fact,
endorsed it.
But Justice O'Connor said the Court should have used
this case to revisit and overturn the 1990 decision in the
peyote case, from which she dissented and that she still
regards, it was clear from her 23-page opinion today, as
profoundly wrong.
Justices Breyer and Souter also called for re-examining
the 1990 case.
The Court has declared several Federal laws
unconstitutional in the past few years. Last year, it
invalidated part of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, a
1988 law that permitted Indian tribes to sue states in
disputes over establishing casinos. Two years ago, the
Court ruled that a Federal gun control law exceeded the
power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce.
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LAWS ARE URGED TO PROTECT RELIGION
The New York Times
July 15, 1997
Linda Greenhouse
The effort to counter the Supreme Court's recent
decision that struck down the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act is likely to take the form of
legislation and steer clear of a contentious effort to
amend the Constitution, testimony at a Congressional
hearing indicated today.
Representative Charles T. Canady, the Florida
Republican who heads the Constitution subcommittee
of the House Judiciary Committee, said at a
subcommittee hearing that a constitutional
amendment would be "ill-advised," premature and
"most likely would not pass in any event."
Mr. Canady called the hearing to explore other
approaches to shielding religious observances from
Government regulation, the goal of the doomed
Federal law that had passed both houses of Congress
in 1993 with only three dissenting votes.
Lawyers for several of the major religious groups
that made up an unusually broad coalition that
supported the law all urged legislative action rather
than an amendment.
"My overriding message is one of caution," said the
Rev. Oliver Thomas, special counsel to the National
Council of the Churches of Christ, and the chairman
of the coalition four years ago.
Mr. Thomas, while calling the Supreme Court's
decision "a profound national wrong," said a
constitutional amendment would "create a bigger
problem than the one we seek to solve."
Mr. Thomas and other witnesses, including a law
professor who played a leading role in drafting the
1993 law, predicted today that more narrowly written
laws tied to Congress's authority to regulate interstate
commerce and to control Federal spending would
accomplish the goal of protecting religious practices
and surviving a Supreme Court challenge.
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act said no
level of government could enforce a law that
"substantially burdened" the free exercise of religion
unless the law served a "compelling governmental
interest" and was the "least restrictive means" of
serving that interest. On June 25, in a 6-to-3 decision
in City of Boerne v. Flores, the Supreme Court ruled
that the law was unconstitutional because it exceeded
Congress's authority.
In passing the measure, Congress had invoked its
authority under Section 5 of the 14th Amendment,
which gives it the power to enforce constitutional
rights and to prevent violations of those rights by the
states. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy's opinion for the
Court said the law amounted to a substantive change
in the meaning of the Constitution, an unauthorized
expansion of constitutional rights, rather than a
permissible enforcement or remedy within the proper
meaning of Section 5.
While the hearing today was in one sense the first
step of a congressional response, in another sense it
was only the latest chapter in an unusual dialogue
that Congress and the Court have been conducting
since 1990. That year, in the decision in Employment
Division v. Smith, the Court ruled that the
"compelling interest" test was not part of the First
Amendment's guarantee of the free exercise of
religion. A generally applicable law that happened to
place a burden on religious practices did not violate
the Constitution, the Court said. The Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, making the
compelling-interest test a matter of Federal law, was
the response to the 1990 decision.
Mark E. Chopko, general counsel of the United
States Catholic Conference, which supported the law,
said at the hearing today that the use of the word
'restoration" in its title was a red flag to the Justices
that Congress was encroaching on the Court's
domain. Mr. Chopko urged Congress to "avoid the
linguistics of 'restoration' " and focus instead on the
goal of protecting religious liberty through
legislation. Trying to pass a constitutional
amendment would be divisive, he said.
Marc D. Stern, legal director of the American
Jewish Congress, urged Congress to compile a
"careful record" of the negative impact that
regulations burdening religion can have on the
economy. For example, Mr. Stern said, many Roman
Catholics might not want to live in a state where
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liquor laws would not permit minors to drink
communion wine.
With an adequate record, he said, Congress should
be able to defend a new version of the law as an
exercise of its power to regulate interstate commerce.
Mr. Stem and Douglas Laycock, a law professor at
the University of Texas who was instrumental in
drafting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, also
urged Congress to consider requiring a high level of
protection for religious observances as a condition of
receiving Federal money, much as Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 has been effective in barring
racial discrimination in programs that receive
Federal aid.
One issue mentioned at the hearing was the effect
of the Supreme Court decision on Congress's ability
to apply the Religious Freedom Restoration Act to
Federal laws, as opposed to state or local laws, a
question the Court did not directly address. Professor
Laycock and others said that since Section 5 of the
14th Amendment dealt only with Congressional
authority over the states, the Court's interpretation of
Section 5 left undisturbed Congress's authority to
make law for the Federal Government.
But to be sure, he said, Congress should pass a joint
resolution or a new measure to assert that the 1993
law is still binding on the Federal Government.
Amid the general enthusiasm for moving ahead
with a Federal reply to the Court's decision, one
witness, Jeffrey S. Sutton, the Solicitor General of
Ohio, said the law had created a problem for Ohio
and other states. Its failure to exempt prisons from its
coverage led to burdensome and often frivolous
lawsuits from prisoners who claimed violations of
their religious rights, Mr. Sutton said.
Mr. Sutton, who argued in the Supreme Court on
behalf of 16 states that the law violated state
sovereignty, said the Ohio Attorney General, Betty D.
Montgomery, had drafted a proposed state "religious
liberty act" that did not cover prisons. While other
witnesses said a state-by-state approach would lead to
an unwieldy patchwork of religious protection, Mr.
Sutton said states should be permitted to experiment.
The concept of federalism that the Court honored
in its decision last month "was also designed to
protect individual liberty," he said.
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RELIGIOUS LEADERS FEAR IMPLICATIONS OF RECENT COURT RULING
The Dallas Morning News
Saturday, July 19, 1997
Michael D. Goldhaber
The National Council of Churches' counsel likens it
to the case that endorsed human slavery.
The Southern Baptist Convention's counsel calls it
"the worst religious liberty decision of the last 50
years."
The Rev. Richard John Neuhaus, editor-in-chief of
First Things magazine, says it turns believers into
second-class citizens.
It is Boerne vs. Flores, the Supreme Court decision
that last month voided the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993. RFRA was so popular that it
passed the House unanimously - supported even by civil
libertarians. The act was pushed by nearly every faith
under the sun, from Methodists to Muslims to
Rastafarians.
Yet RFRA is hardly a household word. Even as
religious leaders plan their response to the court's
decision, they're explaining to their rank and file why
they believe it matters so desperately.
What they tell their flocks is that America is debating
the basic meaning of religious freedom. The debate is
not over separation of church and state; it is not over
outright repression. Rather, religious leaders say, the
debate concerns the thousand small ways that the
modern regulatory state impinges on the lifestyles of the
devout.
RFRA barred the state from substantially burdening
religion except to narrowly advance a compelling
interest. Translation: Religious folks were often
exempted from various legal rules.
Under RFRA, prisoners won the right to wear crosses.
People renting out rooms in their homes were fighting
for the right to exclude tenants whose lifestyles they
found morally troubling. Two days after Boerne, the
Supreme Court signaled that no such rights exist.
The implications don't stop there. Boerne puts a big
asterisk after any claim legitimized by RFRA. A survey
of the case law shows that these include:
The right of a church to help the homeless in violation
of zoning.
The right of Sikh children to bring blunted knives to
school.
The right of a Muslim inmate in Texas to keep a short
beard.
The right of death row inmates to choose their method
of baptism.
After Boerne, law will increasingly be pitted against
faith, according to a statement issued by 40 ecumenical
Christian leaders. The group predicts that "millions of
Americans will be alienated from a government that
they no longer recognize as their own."
Two historical positions on religious liberty have been
identified by Michael W. McConnell, writing in the
Harvard Law Review.
The traditional liberal stance: Render unto Caesar
what Caesar demands and unto God what Caesar
allows. The evangelical view: Duties to God take
primacy over duties to Caesar. To evangelicals,
religious freedom means freedom to follow dogma.
Although minority sects led the fight for free exercise
clauses, Mr. McConnell writes, the liberal view
dominated. Evangelicals finally found their champion
in the unlikely person of Chief Justice Earl Warren. In
1963, the Supreme Court restored unemployment pay to
a Seventh-day Adventist fired for keeping Sabbath. The
principle that the case established was rarely applied in
practice.
This decade, the law has lurched from one extreme to
the other. In 1990, Oregon vs. Smith - also known as
the peyote case - the court scorned the notion of
religious exemptions from general rules. In RFRA,
Congress promised routine exemptions. Last month, in
Boerne, the court reverted to the no-exemption peyote
rule.
The peyote case was about two American Indian drug
counselors who were fired for smoking "the divine
cactus." Oregon denied them unemployment pay under
its general rule on workers dismissed for misconduct.
The court, in an opinion written by Justice Antonin
Scalia, sided with the state. A general rule, it held,
never violates religious freedom - whatever its effects.
The court reasoned that the Constitution guarantees
only neutrality and that courts are ill-equipped to
ascertain what beliefs deserve extra protection.
"In a secular state," responds American Jewish
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Congress counsel Marc D. Stern, "neutrality doesn't do
what is necessary to allow religion to flourish."
Boerne renewed the great debate. Boerne, Texas, is no
stranger to religious strife. The German-born Free
Thinkers who founded the town posted a sign in the
mid-19th century: "Ministers and Priests, Don't let
sundown catch you in this town."
Some priests managed to sneak in. Today, Boerne's St.
Peter the Apostle Catholic Church has more than 1,000
families, but its building seats only 220. Local zoning
law for landmarks blocked the church's expansion. The
church demanded an exemption under RFRA. Instead,
it got caught in the Capitol Hill cross fire.
Congress thought it could enact RFRA under the
clause enforcing the 14th Amendment guarantee that
no state may deprive a person of liberty without due
process.
But in Boeme, the court held that RFRA went too far:
"Legislation which alters the meaning of the Free
Exercise Clause cannot be said to be enforcing the
Clause. Congress does not enforce a constitutional right
by changing what the right is."
Mr. Stern, who helped draft RFRA, says Congress
"got caught in a time warp." In 1993, he believes,
"RFRA was well within Congress' powers." Mr. Stern
sees the Boerne case as part of a larger trend in which
the Supreme Court narrows congressional powers under
the banner of states' rights.
In any event, RFRA supporters are back to square one.
Those who wish to restore the restoration of religious
freedom say they have four choices. They can go back
to the court. They can go back to Congress. They can go
to the states. Or they can seek a constitutional
amendment.
Court watchers like to count gray heads. Justices
Sandra Day O'Connor, David Souter and Stephen
Breyer dissented in Boerne. Although Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsberg voted with the majority on
congressional power, court watchers believe that she
has a broad view of religious liberty.
That means a shift of one vote would swing the Court.
The two oldest members of the Court, Justice John Paul
Stevens and Chief Justice William Rehnquist, are
anti-RFRA. Religious liberty lobbyists say they plan to
press for a pro-RFRA nominee to take the next open
seat.
The next recourse is Congress. Resolutions
condemning Boerne are likely in the near term,
lobbyists say. The bigger challenge on Capitol Hill is to
redraft RFRA to satisfy the court's strictures. The House
Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution held a
hearing this week to consider legal strategies.
Mr. Stern says no strategy would allow Congress to
pass a perfect substitute. A new RFRA grounded in
Congress' commerce or spending power, he says, would
probably not reach important categories of state action,
like zoning.
Similarly, lobbyists say, Congress could strengthen
facets of the civil rights laws that forbid intentional
discrimination. But that would only indirectly address
the conduct targeted by RFRA. And while Congress's
treaty power might justify a broad RFRA-type law, say
lobbyists, international law is unpalatable to
conservatives.
Beyond the federal level, lobbyists could turn to state
courts and legislatures. Seven states interpret their
constitutions to broadly protect religious liberty. One
state has passed a miniature RFRA, and four are
debating mini-RFRAs. Texas is not among them.
Anyway, lobbyists say state solutions are second-best
because they would create an uneven patchwork of
laws.
That leaves the option of a constitutional amendment.
"For now, we oppose running headlong into an
attempt to amend the Constitution," states J. Brent
Walker, general counsel of the Baptist Joint Committee,
a group that has taken the lead in organizing the
religious liberty lobby.
Mr. Walker says that amending the First Amendment
is especially touchy because it has never been done. He
adds that, to earn approval of three-fourths of the states,
an amendment would almost surely have to omit
protection for prisoners. But he and his allies don't rule
out seeking an amendment.
Most attorneys general contend that religious freedom
undermines prison administration, and many filed a
brief opposing RFRA. About half of the claims filed
under RFRA involved prisoners. Even so, U.S. Attorney
General Janet Reno and Texas Attorney General Dan
Morales are both firmly pro-RFRA.
The religious liberty lobby believes that the same
standards should apply to all citizens.
"We want religion in the prisons," said Senate sponsor
Orrin Hatch, R-Utah, during the RFRA debate. "It is
one of the best rehabilitative influences we can have."
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RFRA IS NOT NEEDED
NEW YORK LAND USE REGULATIONS ACCOMMODATE RELIGIOUS USE
New York Law Journal
Wednesday, July 23, 1997
John Nolon and Helen Maher
BY INVALIDATING the far-reaching Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) (42 U.S.C.A.
s2000bb (1993)) in City of Boerne v. Flores (1997 WL
345322 (U.S. June 25, 1997)), the U.S. Supreme Court
reaffirmed the separation of powers doctrine and the
role of Congress in the federal system, tipping the
balance of power toward the states and the judiciary.
The high court struck down the sweeping, popularly
supported RFRA statute as an attempt by Congress to
interpret the substantive rights protected by the
Constitution and to decide cases and controversies.
The Court affirmed that the judiciary is the illuminator
of constitutionally protected rights and that the states
should be unencumbered by far-reaching limitations on
their authority, particularly in the absence of clear
evidence that they have threatened constitutional
guarantees. RFRA was found by the Court to be "a
considerable congressional intrusion into the states'
traditional prerogatives and general authority to
regulate for the health and welfare of their citizens."
Background
The controversy in City of Boerne arose when a
Catholic church in Boerne, Texas, announced its plans
to expand the size of its building to accommodate its
growing membership. Before the necessary building
permit could be obtained, the city established an
historic district that included the church property. The
ordinance required city approval of any construction
affecting historic buildings within the district.
City officials rejected the archbishop's building permit
request because the plans involved the destruction of all
but the facade of the church building which exemplifies
mission revival architecture emblematic of the original
Spanish missions in South Texas. The archbishop
claimed that the ordinance violated RFRA, since the
existing building was not large enough to serve all of its
parishioners: a matter involving the free exercise of
their religion.
RFRA prevented federal, state and local governments
from substantially burdening the exercise of religion
even if the burden resulted from a rule of general
application. The Act applied a strict scrutiny test to all
laws burdening religious practice and required the
government to demonstrate that the application of its
burden is in furtherance of a compelling governmental
interest and is the least restrictive measure of furthering
that interest.
The district court held that Congress exceeded its
authority by enacting RFRA, but the Fifth Circuit
reversed, holding that RFRA was constitutional and
applicable to local ordinances that protect historic
districts and landmarks.
The Holding
Justice Anthony Kennedy writing for a 6-3 majority in
City of Boerne, labeled RFRA's strict scrutiny language
"the most demanding test known to constitutional law,"
which in this context reflects "a lack of proportionality
or congruence between the means adopted and the
legitimate end to be achieved."
Congressional hearings had not revealed recent
evidence of laws targeting religious practice or
motivated by discriminatory intent. Justice Kennedy
noted that, as distinguished from other statutes designed
by Congress to remedy or prevent violations of
constitutional rights, RFRA's "[s]weeping coverage
ensures its intrusion at every level of government,
displacing laws and prohibiting official actions of
almost every description and regardless of subject
matter."
In this context, the Court found that the legislation was
not a proper exercise of Congress's power to remedy or
prevent the infringement of constitutionally protected
rights. "RFRA," Justice Kennedy wrote, "was designed
to control cases and controversies, such as the one
before us; but as the provisions of the federal statute
here invoked are beyond congressional authority, it is
this Court's precedent, not RFRA, which must control."
Prior to 1990, the Supreme Court subjected laws
burdening the exercise of religion to a compelling state
interest test. (Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406
(1963)). Sherbert held that courts must find that the
burden imposed by the law is necessary to achieve a
compelling state interest that justifies any substantial
infringement of an individual's First Amendment
rights.
The Sherbert standard was changed in Employment
Division Services v. Smith (494 U.S. 872 (1990))
which held that the government need not show a
compelling basis for burdening a religious organization
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or person engaged in obeying religious dictates when it
imposes a facially neutral requirement of general
applicability.
Smith allowed Oregon's drug laws to be enforced
against members of the Native American Church who
believed that peyote embodies their deity and that
ingesting it was an act of worship and communion.
The plaintiffs were discharged from their jobs as drug
counselors at a rehabilitation clinic and denied
unemployment compensation because of an Oregon
statute that denied benefits to employees who had been
discharged for work-related misconduct. In Smith, the
Supreme Court adopted a new test regarding free
exercise claims, stating, "if prohibiting the exercise of
religion is not the object of the [regulation] but merely
the incidental effect of a generally applicable and
otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not
been offended."
In cases that include religious freedom claims in
addition to other constitutional claims, the Court
concluded that the compelling state interest test would
continue to be applied. The Smith test was further
refined in Church of The Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.
City of Hialeah, (508 U.S. 520 (1993)), in which the
Court stated that laws must be both neutral and
generally applicable, and "a law failing to satisfy these
requirements must be justified by a compelling
governmental interest and must be narrowly tailored to
advance that interest."
Historic Preservation
Historic preservation and landmark preservation
ordinances, of the type enacted in Boerne, Texas, can
impose severe impacts on the owners of religious
property. In the interest of preserving the historical
integrity of buildings and districts, such ordinances can
prevent the expansion of religious buildings to provide
sufficient space for worship. Such ordinances can
frustrate the sale of historic religious properties for the
purpose of securing funds needed for religious purposes.
The ordinances can even prevent the expression of
religious beliefs by regulating the architecture employed
in construction.
In New York, the conflict between historic preservation
and landmark ordinances and the freedom to use
religious properties thus far has been resolved in favor
of local regulatory authority. For example, in Society
for Ethical Culture v. Spatt (416 NYS2d 246 (1st Dept.
1979), affirmed 415 N.E.2d 922 (N.Y. 1980)), the
religious organization was prevented from demolishing
a meeting house to build market-rate apartments to
secure funding for its religious activities.
The plaintiff claimed that the free exercise clause of
the Constitution was violated by the ordinance. The
court held that because of the secular nature of the
proposed use of the property, no First Amendment
violation had occurred. Similarly, in Rector, Wardens
and Members of the Vestry of St. Bartholomew's
Church v. City of New York (914 F.2d 348 (2d Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 905 (1991)), the church
alleged that the New York City Landmarks Preservation
Law unconstitutionally burdened its right to free
exercise of religion.
The church planned to replace a community center
building with a 47-story office tower but was denied a
permit by the City of New York and the Landmarks
Preservation Commission. The court upheld the
landmarks law relying on Smith. It characterized the
law as "facially neutral regulation of general
applicability" holding that "no First Amendment
violation has occurred absent a showing of
discriminatory motive, coercion in religious practice, or
the church's inability to carry out its religious mission
in its existing facilities." The St. Bartholomew and
Spatt holdings make it unlikely that a facial challenge
to the application of a historic or landmark preservation
law will succeed.
In an instance such as the Texas case, where the
religious institution can show that the effect of the law
is to render it unable to carry out its religious mission,
an as applied challenge may still be attempted.
Similarly, where the religious institution claims that
architectural expression of its beliefs is prevented, it is
possible that an issue of freedom of expression may be
added to an alleged violation of free expression; under
Smith the court might continue to apply the compelling
state interest test.
Finally, where there is evidence that the law is applied
in some specific or individualized way to religious
properties, it may fail to qualify for the protective Smith
test since it may not be neutral or of general
applicability.
Historic preservation and landmark laws that provide
specific exemptions, requiring case-by-case reviews,
may be particularly vulnerable to such an as applied
claim. Even these as applied challenges, however, face
the force of the broad language in Smith which appears
to vitiate free exercise challenges to landmark laws or
other "valid and neutral law[s] of general applicability"
that avoid directly regulating "religious beliefs as such."
Land Use Practice
Outside the limited arena of historic district and
landmark preservation legislation, the courts in New
York have greatly favored religious institutions in their
battles with local land use authorities. Most of the New
York decisions are based on the courts' interpretation of
the police power and do not involve free exercise issues
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of the type raised by the archbishop in Boerne.
The thrust of New York case law is that religious uses
of property advance the public welfare and, therefore,
cannot be excluded or heavily burdened by local land
use regulations. The authority of local governments to
enact zoning and other land use regulations is granted
to them by the state Legislature to promote the public
health, safety, morals and welfare.
Presumptively, a local land use regulation that excludes
or heavily burdens the religious use of property is ultra
vires the authority of the local government.
In Cornell University v. Bagnardi, (503 N.E.2d 509
(N.Y. 1986)), the court stated, "Because of the
inherently beneficial nature of churches and schools to
the public, we held that the total exclusion of such
institutions from a residential district serves no end that
is related to the morals, health, welfare and safety of the
community."
Most local zoning ordinances provide for places of
worship as a permitted use in zoning districts, including
single family neighborhoods. For nearly 50 years, local
governments have known that the exclusion of religious
uses was beyond their authority.
In North Shore Unitarian Society v. Plandome, (109
NYS2d 803 (1951)), the court wrote that to exclude
religious uses "would not substantially promote the
health, safety, morals or general welfare of the
community." This practice is so uniform that the issue
of exclusion of religious uses has never reached the
Court of Appeals.
In Jewish Reconstructionist Synagogue of the North
Shore v. Incorporated Village of Roslyn Harbor (342
N.E.2d 534 (N.Y. 1975)), the court held that where the
benefits attributable to public worship conflict with the
local interest in preventing detrimental impacts on the
surrounding neighborhood, and where this conflict
cannot be reconciled by imposing reasonable conditions
on the religious land use, the interests of the
neighborhood must yield to the interests of public
worship.
In Holy Spirit Assoc. for the Unification of World
Christianity v. Rosenfeld, (458 NYS2d 920 (2d Dept.
1983)), the court stated, "Generally, municipalities
should make efforts to accommodate proposed religious
uses, subject to conditions reasonably related to land
use." This is so, held the court, "even when it would be
inconvenient for the community."
These rulings make it difficult for zoning boards to
deny applications for area variances or for planning
boards to deny applications for special permits where
religious uses of the land are proposed.
In other contexts, such denials are afforded a
presumption of validity and upheld if any reasonable
interpretation of the facts on the record supports the
denial. Where a religious use is proposed, more is
needed to justify a denial.
In Harrison Orthodox Minyan Inc. v. Harrison (552
NYS2d 434 (2d Dept. 1990)), it was held that a
religious institution's application for a special permit
may not be denied unless it is shown affirmatively that
the board attempted to accommodate the use.
The reach of these holdings extends to the protection of
a wide variety of "accessory uses" in which churches
and other religious institutions engage. "To limit a
church to being merely a house of prayer and sacrifice
would, in a large degree, be depriving the church of the
opportunity of enlarging, perpetuating and
strengthening itself and the congregation ... "
Community Synagogue v. Bates, 136 N.E.2d 488, 493
(N.Y. 1956).
New York case law has sustained many accessory uses
to houses of worship such as day care centers, parish
houses and rectories, social clubs, recreational facilities,
soup kitchens, overnight shelters for the homeless and
even a broadcast studio and religious correspondence
school.
It is difficult to imagine how religious land uses could
have been further protected by RFRA, beyond the area
of historic district and landmark preservation. In the
application of land use regulations generally, religious
uses will not be prejudiced by the invalidation of RFRA.
Conclusion
In City of Boerne v. Flores, the U.S. Supreme Court
doubted that the legislative record created by Congress
in adopting RFRA demonstrated that there was a need
for such far-reaching legislation to remedy or prevent
violations of the constitutional guarantee of the free
exercise of religion.
Certainly the judicial record in New York regarding
land use regulations validates that concern. To date
only the secular uses of religious property have been
thwarted by the application of historic preservation
laws.
More importantly, in their review of the application of
land use regulations generally, the New York courts
have protected religious exercise effectively by holding
consistently that the religious use of property, and a
wide variety of accessory uses, are in the public interest
and, absent clear evidence to the contrary, must be
accommodated by land use regulations.
Copyright 1997 by the New York Law Publishing Co.
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HIGH COURT: REDESIGNING THE ARCHITECTURE OF GOVERNMENT
Editorial
The Hartford Courant
Tuesday, July 1, 1997
Paul Gewirtz
There was only one case handed down at Friday's
closing session of the most interesting Supreme Court
term in memory. But as a closing monument, it was
certainly fitting.
The court struck down the Brady bill's regulation of
gun sales as exceeding Congress' powers. In doing so,
the court underscored what this hugely important term
has been centrally about: the architecture of
government.
In insistent, sometimes modest, but often dramatic
ways, the Supreme Court is retooling the basic design,
repeatedly taking on fundamental questions: Which
institutions of government have what powers? What
immunities from interference by others? How is
institutional power divided within the national
government and between the national government and
the states?
Other court terms have been hugely important because
of the substantive issues they resolve: abortion,
affirmative action, death penalties, religious liberty --
those great rooms of late 20th-century American
constitutional law. This term was less about substance
than structure. It was about the architecture that creates
the rooms, and that structures what happens in the
rooms.
The Brady bill case was all about federalism, the
division of power between Congress and the states.
Congress had temporarily enlisted local law
enforcement officers to help carry out the federal gun
control program, and this, the court concluded,
unconstitutionally interfered with the states.
In clipping Congress' powers and bolstering those of
the states, even on a matter of such undoubted national
concern, the court is further expanding other recent
federalism decisions that overturn arrangements set
down in the New Deal and that seek to restore a design
from an older period.
The earlier decision striking down the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) was even more
significant. Congress had tried to mandate broader
protection for the free exercise of religion than the court
itself had mandated a few years ago. Ordinarily,
Congress is free to pass laws that go beyond more
constrained judicial mandates. There was strong
precedent from the 1960s that upheld Congress' powers
under the 14th Amendment to grant broader protections
to racial minorities than the court's own constitutional
rulings had mandated.
But the RFRA decision this week limited Congress'
powers, bolstering the powers of others. Congress, the
court said, had usurped powers belonging to two other
branches of government: the states and those of the
Supreme Court itself, whose power to say what the
Constitution means (the court claimed) had been
improperly grabbed by Congress.
And in refusing to carry forward the broad view of
congressional powers reflected in earlier cases, the court
signaled again that it views expansive rulings of the
1960s as special responses to racial equality imperatives
of that time and not general principles about our
governmental structure.
The court's other major religion case this term also
significantly reconfigures our constitutional
architecture. This one allowed millions of dollars of
federal funds to provide remedial education for students
in parochial schools. In overturning several prior
decisions, the court-as-architect tore down a large
section of the wall separating church and state.
The president's place in the architecture was at the
heart of the decision involving President Clinton and
Paula Jones. The court rejected the president's claim
that his unique role entitles him to postpone defending
the case until he left office. Only time will tell whether
the court's refusal to extend immunities will unduly
interfere with and therefore diminish sitting presidents.
Although the court dismissed the line item veto case
on standing grounds, postponing (but only postponing)
the day of reckoning, its decision itself was a major
architectural ruling. The court rejected the
appropriateness of members of Congress' bringing this
and much other litigation, thereby closing off a road
that has often been used to get into the lower federal
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courts and get many important separation-of-powers
questions litigated.
Lastly, the assisted-suicide cases are cases about
institutional architecture. The court's main point was
that in our structure of government, the "earnest and
profound debate about the morality, legality, and
practicality of physician-assisted suicide" was not for
the court to resolve definitely. "Our holding permits this
debate to continue, as it should in a democratic society,"
the court said.
Or, as Justice O'Connor put it in her concurring
opinion, striking the proper balance on this issue was
not for the court to decide, but "is entrusted to the
'laboratory' of the states in the first instance." The
case represents a broader trend of the court's pulling
back from a broader interventionist role on
controversial social issues represented by the abortion
decisions.
End-of-term wrapups tend to focus on personalities
(who were the swing justices, who has been
marginalized) and on absorbing issues of individual
rights. But this term the focus should be on structure.
The Supreme Court is redesigning the basic
institutional architecture of our public lives. These
rulings have a more abstract quality than others. But,
for better or for ill, the court's insistence on certain
structures of power has enormous consequences,
determining what government can or cannot do,
relatively empowering or disempowering certain
political forces, and affecting how individual liberties
are protected -- not only in the cases at hand but for
many years to come.
Copyright 1997
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SOME STATES RACING TO GRASP BATON OF
POWER PASSED BY HIGH COURT
The Washington Post
Sunday, June 29, 1997
Ceci Connolly
Two days after the Supreme Court gave states the
authority to lock up sexual predators beyond their jail
terms, the New York Senate passed a bill doing just
that.
It was the first example in what promises to be an
aggressive effort by states to seize new powers
bestowed on them this session by the Supreme Court.
The attorney general in Ohio is writing her own
religious freedom bill. A sheriff in Montana plans to
stop background checks on handgun buyers. And one
emboldened lawmaker in Colorado says he interprets
the rulings as an invitation to fight onerous new
federal welfare regulations.
"The government closest to the people tends to
operate the best," said Michigan state Sen. William
Van Regenmorter (R).
In a burst of activity before breaking for the summer,
the Supreme Court issued a series of rulings last week
that recalibrates the scales of power in favor of states.
For three years running, a narrow majority has
pushed the court to trim federal authority.
But in a sense, the justices have come late to
devolution, as policy wonks call shifting power to the
states. For close to a decade, politicians of all stripes
have embraced the rallying cry: get the feds off our
backs. It helped catapult Republicans into Congress
and pressured President Clinton to roll back 60 years
worth of social policy.
"What the folks in New York want is not necessarily
what the folks in Kansas want," said Kansas Attorney
General Carla Stovall (R). "I wouldn't want
California's laws here."
Skeptics fear a state-by-state approach will result in
a jumble of incompatible laws. Congress, despite
pledges of allegiance to state supremacy, is still
reluctant to relinquish control. And even local
officials concede that with the added freedom come
some headaches.
Although much of the debate at the court involved
complex constitutional arguments, the real-world
implications will be shaped in large part by politics.
On the controversial question of legalizing assisted
suicide, which the court left up to the states, many
may "hang back," as New York state Sen. James J.
Lack (R) put it. "It becomes a tough political issue."
In Kansas v. Hendricks, the court allowed states to
incarcerate sex offenders in mental institutions once
their criminal sentences end. Experts say it is hard to
imagine a state that won't jump at the chance. "A lot
of people tend to feel these are individuals who are
pretty sick and rehabilitation doesn't work very well,"
said Ohio Senate President Richard Finan (R). "Who
wants to put an unrehabilitated child sex offender
back on the street?"
On most other issues though, the ramifications are
likely to be as varied as the 50 states. The only
certainty is that with last week's batch of rulings, the
nation is witnessing a dramatic retreat from the strong
federalism begun during the Depression and lasting
well into the 1980s.
Fearful that states could not, or would not, provide
adequately for the needy or protect minorities,
Congress devoted much of the 20th century to
building a massive safety net and enacting civil rights
legislation. Programs such as Social Security, welfare,
unemployment insurance and Medicare swelled, and
so did the federal deficit.
With talk of pampered welfare queens, Ronald
Reagan took aim at the bloated, unpopular program.
But it wasn't until House Speaker Newt Gingrich
(R-Ga.) and Clinton got together that welfare was
turned over to the states. Now, they are rethinking
affirmative action.
Across the street from the Capitol, the justices took
their first step back from federalism in a 1992 case
involving state disposal of radioactive waste. In 1995,
the court ruled Congress could not prohibit guns near
schools and last year it stopped Congress from
interfering in gambling disputes at Indian
reservations.
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The rulings handed down this session both curtail
federal authority and enhance state power.
"This is the end of a two-generation cycle of highly
centralized federal control," said New York's Sen.
Lack. "We've gone from the legislative and executive
side to the court system as well. In an evolutionary
sense the court is reflecting the social policy that has
been taking place in the country."
Although many state officials say it will take time to
decipher last week's rulings, others are ready to move.
Ohio Attorney General Betty D. Montgomery (R),
who opposed a federal law to protect religious activity
from government intrusion, is nevertheless drafting
her own state version. It will be identical to the
federal law struck down by the Supreme Court except
it will exclude prison inmates, a group Montgomery
contends has exploited the law to mask dangerous
behaviors such as martial arts.
"We want to show that the Supreme Court was
correct," Montgomery said. "States can effectively
protect religious liberties."
Taking his cue from two of last week's rulings.
Michigan's Van Regenmorter, who chairs the
Judiciary Committee, is drafting one bill on sexual
predators and another to ban assisted suicide.
Colorado Senate President Tom Norton (R) hopes to
go further, applying new state authority beyond the
specific cases. Disgruntled with provisions in the new
welfare law that force states to aggressively track
deadbeat parents, Norton believes that the court's
willingness to invest more power in the states means
they can ignore that costly mandate.
But the legislators won't be acting in a vacuum. In
Michigan, proponents of assisted suicide are
mounting a petition drive to put the issue on the 1998
ballot, while the anti-pornography group Enough Is
Enough says it is lobbying state lawmakers to do what
the Supreme Court said Congress could not: keep
smut off the Internet.
State leaders say they can better deal with society's
problems today than during the Great Depression or
the civil rights strife of the 1960s, when Congress
stepped in. But some experts predict trouble will arise
when money is tight.
Extended incarceration for sexual predators "seems
like a good idea," said Thad Beyle, a political scientist
at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
"However, if the prisons are filled and they have to
build more, where are they going to get the money?"
Even ardent devolutionists acknowledge a proper
role for the federal government. Several attorneys
general worried that Friday's ruling striking down the
provision of the Brady law requiring states, on an
interim basis, to do background checks on handgun
buyers will make it easier for criminals to shop in
states with the least restrictions.
As Maryland Attorney General J. Joseph Curran Jr.
(D) put it: "We're not an island; we're part of a
nation."
Copyright 1997, The Washington Post
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The Supreme Court and Congress are on a collision
course. Three times in the final week of its term, the
high court struck down laws passed by overwhelming
congressional majorities, championed by the president,
and defended by the Justice Department. This is
historically unprecedented. Even during the last great
confrontation between the branches in the 1930s, anti-
New Deal justices never overturned so many federal
statutes in so short a time.
Judicial resistance to popular rule through Congress
is most starkly displayed in City of Boerne v. Flores, in
which the court overturned the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA). Justices Kennedy, Stevens,
and Ginsburg joined hands with Justices Scalia and
Thomas and Chief Justice Rehnquist in the 6-3 ruling,
which insisted that the court, not Congress, has "the
final word" in interpreting the Constitution. Congress
passed RFRA in 1993 at the behest of a large coalition
of religious groups unhappy with a 1990 Supreme Court
decision, Employment Division v. Smith. The court had
sided in that case with the state of Oregon, which
denied unemployment benefits to workers fired for using
the hallucinogenic drug peyote. Because the workers
used the drug for religious purposes, they claimed the
state had violated their First Amendment right to freely
exercise their religion. Both mainline and fringe
religious groups worried that Smith would pave the way
for local and state governments to violate their
free-exercise rights, so they called on Congress for
relief
The oral arguments in Boerne made plain that the
Supreme Court saw the case as a showdown with
Congress. Anxious justices pressed the lawyers: Did
lawmakers pass RFRA to express disagreement with
Smith? And as hard as the justices pressed, the lawyers
defending RFRA tried to reassure them that Congress
wouldn't think of reversing the Supreme Court:
Q [from the court]: Now, you admit, I suppose, that
Congress cannot come in and overrule a decision of this
Court it doesn't like by legislation.
Counsel: Congress cannot overrule the Court.
Q: And there's some indication that this was what
Congress was all about here. If Smith were to come
up again, I guess [RFRA] would be an effort by
Congress to overturn that decision. .
Counsel: Overturn is shorthand, but yes, to achieve a
different result on similar facts under the statute than
we would achieve under the Constitution itself, that's
correct, but that's no different from the Voting Rights
Act or from Title VII. ... You still get the final word on
what the statute means.
The lawyers defending RFRA were of course in no
position to meet this line of questioning with its proper
response: Why shouldn't Congress try to correct or
reverse the court? Congress is a co-equal branch of
government, equally entitled to interpret the
Constitution that governs all three branches. The
Religious Freedom Restoration Act may not have been
a wise response to a particular judicial decision. But the
power Congress used to enact it is legitimate.
Lawmakers employed their infrequently used authority
to "enforce" the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Fourteenth Amendment's enforcement power
unnerves judges, because, as RFRA shows, it can be
invoked to challenge their decisions. And it has always
unnerved judges. In overturning RFRA, the justices
barked back to their 19th- century brethren on the high
court who gutted Congress's enforcement power,
overturning the national civil-rights statutes of
Reconstruction, such as the 1871 Ku Klux Klan Act and
the 1875 Civil Rights Act. (With no embarrassment,
Justice Kennedy's opinion for the court in Boerne cited
those long discredited decisions as precedents.) The
modern civil-rights revolution restored Congress's
enforcement power, and since the 1960s the court has
sanctioned measures that depend on that power,
including the Voting Rights Acts of 1965. With one
insignificant exception, until the court's actions last
month, every law enacted in this century under the
Fourteenth Amendment's enforcement provisions has
been upheld.
Congress's enforcement power also makes some
conservatives uncomfortable because of its potential to
expand the power of Washington. RFRA, which limited
the powers of state governments, was controversial for
that very reason. But there are other ways in which
Congress can use its Fourteenth Amendment powers. In
fact, it can reassert its right to these powers and at the
same time resurrect federalism and popular
self-government at the state and local levels against a
nationalizing Supreme Court. And in the wake of
Boerne, it should do so. Lawmakers can begin with a
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simple, unobjectionable proposal: legislation returning
to the states the right to display the Ten
Commandments on government-owned property.
In 1980 the Supreme Court found unconstitutional a
Kentucky law requiring that the Ten Commandments be
displayed in public schools. What's the harm? " If the
posted copies of the Ten Commandments are to have
any effect at all," said the court, "it will be to induce the
school children to read, meditate upon, perhaps to
venerate and obey, the Commandments." Many would
applaud such an effect, but the justices saw it as a threat
to the freedom of impressionable youth. No matter how
desirable the Words of God might be as "a private
devotion," the First Amendment doesn't allow them on
government property, they maintained.
This anti-Ten Commandments policy returned to the
news recently when Alabama judge Roy Moore posted
the Commandments in his courtroom. Federal circuit
judge Charles Price pronounced "Thou shalt not" and
issued a restraining order. The dispute remains in the
federal courts.
Meanwhile, on March 5, the House of Representatives
passed a resolution 295- 125 stating that it was the
sense of the House that the Ten Commandments "set
forth a code of moral conduct, observance of which is
universally acknowledged to promote respect for our
system of laws and the good of society." The House
resolution suggests there is a consensus across religious
faiths that the Commandments should be publicly
respected as the foundation of our constitutional
principles. Two South Carolina counties have since
enacted resolutions to post the Ten Commandments in
their council rooms, and Congress is considering similar
proposals for the Senate and House chambers.
Congress should not be deterred by the Boerne
decision from moving beyond the expression of
sentiments to actual legislation. It should legislate to
enforce the people's right to recognize the
Commandments in public. Yet, ironically, under a
Constitution established to free man from oppression
disguised as religion, many tremble before the high
court as if it were a high priesthood. Civil libertarians
who would never think of obeying ex cathedra decrees
from Rome unhesitatingly declare there is no appealing
a decision of the Supreme Court.
Both history and proper constitutional understanding
teach a quite different lesson. It's true that the
Constitution endows the three co-equal branches of
government with different functions. Congress's
responsibility is to enact laws; the president approves
and enforces the laws made by Congress; the Supreme
Court decides "cases" according to the laws made by
Congress. But the Constitution does not grant any single
branch power to interpret it in a way that the others
must accept. On the contrary: Congress itself interprets
the Constitution each time it passes a law, just as the
chief executive does when he signs and administers
those laws, and the justices do in each case they decide.
Since 1787 the Supreme Court has found some 139
national laws unconstitutional. Most of these judgments
were of no great political moment. So Congress avoided
provocation and did nothing. Occasionally, though, the
lawmakers have challenged the court and have made the
challenge stick. Here are a few examples:
In Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857), the Supreme Court
declared that Congress could not ban slavery in U.S.
territories. As president, Lincoln asked Congress to
overrule the court, and in 1862 (three years before the
Thirteenth Amendment) he signed a statute abolishing
slavery throughout the territories.
After the court in 1918 overturned a federal child
labor law, legislators responded by imposing an excise
tax on the products of child labor. In 1922 the court
rejected that measure as well. On a third try, Congress
overrode both decisions by passing the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938. In U.S. v. Darby (1941), the
justices yielded and conceded Congress's power to
regulate.
In 1959 the court ruled that the Fourteenth
Amendment allowed states to require English literacy
tests for voters. Congress, deciding the tests violated
that amendment's equal protection clause, used its
enforcement power to ban them. In Katzenbach v.
Morgan (1966), the court backed off and set aside its
earlier ruling.
The court in Goldman v. Weinberger (1986) upheld
Air Force regulations prohibiting Orthodox Jews from
wearing yarmulkes on duty. Congress enacted
legislation overriding that holding and instructed the
Air Force to permit the wearing of religious apparel in
uniform.
Religious-liberty and other social-issue cases, of
course, usually involve state, not federal, laws. Why are
states and local communities controlled by restraints
that apparently limit only the national government
("Congress shall make no law . . .")? Since 1925 the
Supreme Court has read the Fourteenth Amendment to
mean that the "liberty" mentioned in the due process
clause brings state governments under the Bill of
Rights. In other words, when state laws regarding
religion and other social issues are overturned, the
courts always assert that they violate the Fourteenth
Amendment, not just the Bill of Rights.
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For more than 60 years the courts have hung on this
fragile constitutional thread their most controversial
decisions -- relating to school prayer, rights of the
accused, judge-imposed taxes, obscenity and
pornography, censorship, abortion, school busing,
public assistance to religious schools, homosexual
rights, and voter-passed referenda. That single thread is
the claim that the Fourteenth Amendment prevents
citizens from enacting state and community laws to
protect America's culture and moral character.
The fragility of this theory as a judicial weapon
became clear once Congress's enforcement power was
restored to pass the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Under
the Fourteenth Amendment's language, Congress has
the same power to enforce not just equal-protection but
due-process rights. That is the power the Supreme Court
disputed in Boerne, but ultimately no one but Congress
can say in what manner its power to enforce these rights
should be used.
Indeed, by hanging its controversial decisions
precisely on the Fourteenth Amendment, which includes
a grant of authority to Congress, the Supreme Court
invites Congress to intervene on the same terrain. And
Congress should intervene, not to place new limits on
states, but to restore self-government in states and local
communities. The Ten Commandments issue is a
perfect starter. Congress could pass a "federalism
shield" law, declaring that the display of the Decalogue
on state and local government-owned property is among
the liberties protected under the Fourteenth
Amendment's due-process " liberties." The statute would
explicitly recognize the reserved right of the people
under the Tenth Amendment to govern themselves by
declaring that the states may use their "police powers"
to regulate these displays. This would restore the
traditional right to acknowledge the Commandments in
public life that people enjoyed until the Supreme Court
abridged it in 1980.
Would Bill Clinton sign such a measure? It's difficult
to imagine him standing against a popular law to
respect the Ten Commandments. The tougher question
is whether the Supreme Court would sustain it. Of
course the ink wouldn't be dry before the ACLU hauled
this law into court. Consider, however, what the modern
Supreme Court has already said about Congress's
enforcement power:
In 1966, the court in U.S. v. Price recognized that
Congress's enforcement power is so broad that it
"embraces all of the rights and privileges secured to
citizens by all of the Constitution and all of the laws of
the United States."
In 1970 Justices Stewart and Blackmun and Chief
Justice Burger swept earlier decisions aside in deference
to Congress's superior fact-finding ability. "Congress,"
they wrote in Oregon v. Mitchell, "may paint with a
much broader brush than may this Court, which must
confine itself to the judicial function of deciding
individual cases and controversies upon individual
records. The findings that Congress made when it
enacted the Voting Rights Act of 1965 would have
supported a nationwide ban on literacy tests."
In the 1980 case of Fullilove v. Klutznick, Burger and
Justices White and Powell said, "Correctly viewed, Sec.
5 [of the Fourteenth Amendment] is a positive grant of
legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise its
discretion in determining whether and what legislation
is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment."
Some court-watchers argue that the justices will strike
down any law that disputes their holdings, and the
overturning of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
implies as much. But except during the 1930s, the
justices have usually been less willing to make war on
the national legislature than to cross swords with the
states.
And there's good reason for the court to be more wary
of Congress than of state legislatures. The states, after
all, can't raise or reduce the number of justices on the
court; Congress can. The states can't change the court's
jurisdiction; Congress can. The states can't make and
unmake the federal court system; Congress can. The
states can't impeach federal judges; Congress can.
Conservative critics of the Supreme Court should
neither despair at its decisions nor propose amendments
that can only weaken people's loyalty to our
constitutional heritage. There is nothing wrong with our
Constitution that time, patience, and political acumen
can't correct.
The way to win a showdown with the court is first to
wage one. If Congress enacts a simple Ten
Commandments bill and the high court voids it,
Congress can respond by passing more far-reaching
measures. "Federalism shield" laws speeding up state
criminal trials or restoring "moment of silence" rights
to public schools come to mind. The Supreme Court
might need a little time to get the message before it
acquiesces in the resurrection of self-government. But
over time the nation's elected legislature is inexorable --
if it is willing to fight.
Copyright 1997 The Weekly Standard
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SOVEREIGNTY'S GRIP ON GUNS
The Connecticut Law Tribune
July 21, 1997
Jerome L. Wilson
There is an important lesson in the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision declaring unconstitutional the
provision of the Brady Handgun Violence Protection
Act that required local sheriffs to conduct background
checks of those seeking a gun license. That lesson has
relatively little to do with the eventual control of guns
in this country and very much to do with the question
of whether the states are going to survive as
independent governmental entities. The constitutional
issue in Printz v. United States, 65 U.S.L.W. 4731
(June 27, 1997), was whether Congress could order
local law enforcement officers to "make a reasonable
effort" within five business days to determine whether
an applicant was eligible to purchase a handgun. The
command to local officers was only for an interim
period, until such time as a national instant background
check system could be set up by the federal government
(no later than 1998). In suits generated by the National
Rifle Association, the two sheriffs in this combined
case asserted that the congressional order violated the
U.S. Supreme Court's 1992 decision in New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144. New York held under the
authority of the 10th Amendment that the federal
government may not compel the states to enact or
administer federal regulatory programs. In his
concurrence in Printz, Justice Clarence Thomas hints
that he might have preferred to decide the case on
Second Amendment grounds ("the right of the people
to keep and bear arms"). However, he concurred with
Justice Antonin Scalia's majority opinion that the
background check provision of the Brady Act violated
the 10th Amendment ("The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution are reserved to
the States.").
Conscription Into Bureaucracy For close observers
of the court, particularly those who have become
increasingly concerned that democracy at the state and
local government level has been eroded by ill-fitting
dictates from the central government, Printz should
come as no surprise. The genesis of the decision may
be found in Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's dissent in
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi,
456 U.S. 742 (1982). At issue in FERC was a federal
law directing state regulatory commissions " to
consider" adopting certain federal regulatory standards
or otherwise to step aside and let the federal
government pre-empt the field. Justice O'Connor found
those directions to be no more than an attempt by
Congress to " conscript state utility commissions into
the national bureaucratic army." "State legislative and
administrative bodies are not field offices of the
national bureaucracy," wrote O'Connor, adding that
"each State is sovereign within its own domain" and
that "the Constitution contemplates an indestructible
Union, composed of indestructible States." Justice
O'Connor then set forth the policy reasons for
preserving state sovereignty. These have been repeated
and refined in the court's decisions over the last decade,
up to and including Printz. They contend that
conscripting the states into federal regulatory programs
(1) "drains the inventive energy of state governmental
bodies," (2) "blurs the lines of political accountability,"
(3) lessens the ability of the states to "serve as
laboratories for the development of new social,
economic, and political ideas, " (4) limits "the
opportunity of all citizens to participate in
representative government," and (5) weakens "a
salutary check on national governmental power." In
1991, this time in the majority in Gregory v. Ashcroft,
501 U.S. 452, Justice O'Connor observed (in language
later quoted in Printz) that the " Constitution
establishes a system of dual sovereignty between the
States and the Federal Government." In Ashcroft, the
court upheld a mandatory retirement age for state
judges found in the state constitution, even in the face
of a challenge under the federal Age Discrimination in
Employment Act. Although the case itself was decided
on grounds of statutory interpretation, O'Connor used
the platform of the opinion to emphasize the duality of
our federal system. Then in 1992, in a 6-3 majority
opinion again written by Justice O'Connor, the court
decided New York v. United States -- the most
important state sovereignty case in decades. New York
adopted what Ohio State University Professor Deborah
Jones Merritt has termed the "autonomy model" of
federalism. This model seeks to preserve the states as
autonomous governmental entities, responsible to the
voters who elect their leaders, just as the leaders of the
federal government are answerable to their respective
electorates. The autonomy model rejects both the near
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impossible task of reserving certain areas of activity
exclusively to state regulation, and the utopian hope
that Congress will exercise self-restraint and not
encroach on the states' prerogatives. The authority for
the autonomy model is the 10th Amendment and the
model's execution requires the courts to shield the
states from congressional attempts to interfere with
state governments' independent relationship with their
own voters - in other words, when the states' autonomy
as independent sovereigns is threatened. At issue in
New York was a federal command to the states either
to enact a federal radioactive waste disposal program or
take title to the waste itself. This, said the court, was no
choice at all. Both alternatives were unconstitutional,
as they "commandeered the legislative processes of the
states by directly compelling them to enact and enforce
a federal regulatory program." Congress may set up
and regulate its own programs directly, observed the
court in New York, and in that process it may pre-empt
contrary state regulations. Alternatively, Congress can
hold out incentives to the states " as a means of
encouraging them to adopt suggested regulatory
schemes." However, the court said, Congress "may not
conscript state governments as its agents." The
constitutional mantra of New York, repeatedly stated,
is that the "Federal Government may not compel the
States to enact or administer a federal regulatory
program." In New York, the court acknowledged that
Congress has the power under the Constitution to
regulate individuals, but held that it does not have
similar regulatory power over states. In fact, the court
made the point (which is repeated in Printz) that in the
context of the commerce power, even where Congress
can regulate directly the activities of individuals, it
cannot order the states to regulate those same activities
as part of a federal regulatory program.
Protection From Best Intentions The value of this
arrangement, Justice O'Connor observed, is that such
a constitutional system "protects us from our own best
intentions: It divides power among sovereigns and
among branches of government precisely so that we
may resist the temptation to concentrate power in one
location as an expedient solution to the crisis of the
day." This observation is quoted verbatim in Printz.
The court also reiterated the point from O'Connor's
FERC dissent that when Congress directs the states to
regulate, state officials are held accountable for
programs for which they properly should not be held
responsible. This then is the precedential prologue to
the Printz holding that Congress' command to local
sheriffs to conduct background checks
unconstitutionally violated the sovereign power of the
states, or as Justice O'Connor puts it in her Printz
concurrence, "The provisions invalidated here, which
directly compel state officials to administer a federal
regulatory program, utterly fail to adhere to the design
and the structure of our constitutional scheme."
However, rather than a 6-3 majority as in New York,
the Printz decision is 5- 4, Justice David H. Souter
having gone over to the other side. The tone of the
majority opinion by Justice Scalia is more
argumentative toward those dissenters than was Justice
O'Connor's opinion in New York. Although Justice
Scalia describes the "prior jurisprudence of this court"
as most conclusive in deciding Printz, his majority
opinion first discusses at length the historical support
for the proposition that Congress cannot command
state administrative officials to do its bidding in
carrying out a federal program, and the reasons why
the very structure of the Constitution also supports that
proposition.
Dueling Interpretations The dissenting opinion in
Printz written by Justice John Paul Stevens is pretty
much of a match for Justice Scalia's opinion in their
dueling interpretations of the nation's early history and
the Federalist Papers. The dissent argues that the
proposition that the federal government has the power
to require state officials to implement national policy
programs is supported not only by the Federalist
Papers, but also by the oath taken by local and state
officials to support the federal Constitution and by the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. Furthermore,
the dissent asserts, "There is not a clause, sentence or
paragraph in the entire text of the Constitution of the
United States that supports the proposition that a local
police officer can ignore a command contained in a
statute enacted by Congress pursuant to an express
delegation of power enumerated in Article 1." Further
buttressing its argument, the Stevens dissent notes the
settled constitutional law that state courts must hear
federal claims whenever a federal statute requires them
to do so, and observes that in earlier times courts
performed what we would today consider
administrative functions. Therefore, present-day state
and local administrative officials, such as sheriffs, can
be required to continue this practice, pursuant to a
federal mandate. Finally, the Stevens dissent makes
what is perhaps its strongest argument of all: that by
"limiting the ability of the Federal Government to
enlist state officials in the implementation of its
programs, the court creates incentives for the National
Government to aggrandize itself." In short, the dissent
suggests, "In the name of State's rights, the majority
would have the Federal Government create vast new
bureaucracies to implement its policies." Convincing as
these arguments may be, Justice Scalia -- with Chief
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Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor,
Anthony M. Kennedy and Thomas -- has the votes. In
light of New York, the Printz majority also quite
clearly has precedent on its side. It hardly takes a giant
step in logic to hold that New York's prohibition
against Congress' commanding state legislatures to
enact a federal regulatory program should also prohibit
Congress from compelling state administrative officials
to enforce a federal regulatory program. This
interpretation is particularly warranted by the frequent
statements in New York dicta to the effect that the
"Federal Government may not compel the States to
enact or administer a federal regulatory program"
(emphasis added). In addition, one can argue that
ultimately the work of a state administrative official is
a state legislative question because both the official's
budget and the definition of the official's duties are, in
the end, a matter for the state legislature to decide.
Some of the dissenting justices in Printz might even
have joined the majority if the case had implicated, in
Justice Stevens' words, "the more difficult questions
associated with congressional coercion of state
legislatures." Implying that its view might be different
if the facts were otherwise, Stevens' dissent notes, "The
Brady Act contains no command directed to a
sovereign State or to a state legislature. It does not
require any state entity to promulgate any federal rule."
Therefore, even if the court were to change its
composition and Stevens' viewpoint were to become the
majority, there is hope that congressional
commandeering of a state's legislative process would
still be held to intrude unconstitutionally on state
sovereignty. In his dissent, Justice Stephen G. Breyer
speaks of "the problem of reconciling central authority
with the need to preserve the liberty-enhancing
autonomy of a smaller constituent government entity."
This statement reflects a recognition of some of the
values of the autonomy model that were previously
recognized in Justice O'Connor's FERC dissent -- such
as meaningful citizen participation in representative
government and clear lines of political accountability.
But however close in spirit the dissenters may or may
not be to the majority, their view is not the rule for
now. As Justice Scalia concludes clearly and absolutely
in Printz,
We held in New York that Congress cannot compel
the States to enact or enforce a federal regulatory
program. Today we hold that Congress cannot
circumvent that prohibition by conscripting the State's
officers directly. The Federal Government may neither
issue directives requiring the States to address
particular problems, nor command the States' officers,
or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or
enforce a federal regulatory program. . . . S uch
commands are fundamentally incompatible with our
constitutional system of dual sovereignty. Double
Security One lingering question remains even in light
of Printz and New York: whether reliance on the
autonomy model -- that states should be free to make
their own policy and administrative judgments -- will
be enough to preserve our basic federal system, a
system that James Madison characterized as "the
compound republic of America." Specifically, will
enough independent sovereign strength be retained by
the states so that the rights of the people will have a
"double security," again to quote Madison, in that the
"different governments will control each other, at the
same time that each will be controlled by itself'? An
alternative model was propounded by the high court to
safeguard the reserve power of states in National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). The
method used was not to protect the states' sovereign
processes, as in New York and now in Printz, but
rather to fence off certain traditional governmental
functions for the states alone. Usery was overruled in
1985 by Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority, 469 U.S. 528, a 5-4 decision characterized
by Justice O'Connor as the court "wash ing its hands of
all efforts to protect the states." Yet the proposition that
certain traditional government functions are
constitutionally reserved to the states may still have
some viability. A case in point is United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), where, in overturning a
federal law prohibiting possession of guns in the
environs of local schools, the majority expressed
concern about Congress being able to regulate all
education matters, an area "where states historically
have been sovereign." The majority opinion in Printz
does not touch this argument, although Justice Thomas'
concurrence suggests that the Constitution "places
whole areas outside the reach of Congress' regulatory
authority." Rather, Printz stands firmly for the
proposition that states shall have full sovereignty over
their own governmental islands of power. Whether
those islands will eventually be eroded by an ever







Since the Progressive era, this magazine has argued
for judicial restraint as part of a broader argument for
liberal nationalism. Judges should defer to the
prerogatives of Congress and the president, the
argument goes, so that popular sovereignty can serve
as the engine of national unity. And so, in 1918, when
the Supreme Court held that Congress's power to
regulate interstate commerce didn't authorize it to ban
the products of child labor, the editors complained that
"a bare majority" had imposed on the nation its "
dubious preference for exclusively local regulation." In
1935, when the Supreme Court unanimously struck
down the code-making process of the National
Recovery Act, the centerpiece of the New Deal, as an
unconstitutional delegation of Congress's authority, the
editors denounced the Court for its " reversal of the
trend toward nationalism and a return to doctrines of
states' rights." In 1937, the Court finally relented and
got out of the business of enforcing constitutional
limits on congressional power; since then, The New
Republic has been preoccupied with another kind of
judicial activism: the Warren-Burger era's expansion
of individual rights.
But this year, for the first time since 1937, the Court
has decided to take seriously the proposition that the
authority of "the Federal government," as Justice
Kennedy put it in his opinion striking down the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), "is one of
enumerated powers." And, for liberal and conservative
partisans of judicial restraint, it's hard to know
whether or not to become hysterical. In 1997, unlike
1935, the Court's muscle-flexing is unlikely to provoke
the president or Congress to respond in kind. Far from
paralyzing the federal government, the Court has
struck down feelgood laws, such as the Brady bill and
the Gun-Free Schools Act. Laws like these are cheap
symbols of federal virtue that interject the national
government into areas that have traditionally, and
properly, been left to the states. Indeed, as Congress
and the president increasingly trivialize federal power
by brandishing it for the sake of appearances,
nationalism itself seems a tarnished ideal.
The Court's new resolve to check lazy and
ill-advised federalization may be good public policy;
but some of the recent decisions are bad constitutional
law. By ignoring constitutional text, misrepresenting
constitutional history and overlooking the legacy of
Reconstruction and the New Deal, the conservative
justices are guilty of precisely the kind of judicial
activism that they rightly criticized on the Warren
Court. And the Court's effort to segregate the federal
and state governments by resurrecting the antebellum
vision of "dual sovereignty," if carried to its logical
conclusion, could call into question not only the
symbolic laws that have been struck down so far, but
a host of more important regulatory schemes--from
welfare reform to environmental standards--organized
around the principle of cooperative federalism.
In the Brady bill case, the Court held that Congress
can't compel state officers to execute or administer
federal laws. In the RFRA case, the Court held that
Congress's power to "enforce" the guarantees of the
Fourteenth Amendment is limited to remedying
constitutional violations by the states, and that
Congress has no power to change the substance of
constitutional rights. In two other recent decisions, the
Court held that principles of state "sovereign
immunity" dramatically restrict Congress's power to
authorize federal courts to enforce rights arising under
federal law. And, in 1995, the Court held that
Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce
doesn't include the power to prohibit guns in schools.
The most troubling aspect of the Brady and
sovereign immunity decisions is their lack of mooring
in the constitutional text. When Justice Stevens read
his dissent from the bench in the Brady case, he
remarked spontaneously that Justice Scalia's opinion
for the Court reminded him of Justice Douglas's
opinion in the Griswold contraceptives case of 1965,
which extrapolated a right to privacy from the
Constitution's "penumbras" and "emanations." And
Justice Kennedy, in his opinion in the Idaho sovereign
immunity case, mischaracterized recent precedents
and ignored the plain language of the Eleventh
Amendment, which sets out specific limits on "the
Judicial power of the United States," rather than
establishing, as Justice Kennedy would have it,
additional limits on congressional power.
The source of the Court's rhetoric of "dual
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sovereignty" and "dual federalism" is not
constitutional text but antebellum history. Although
the conservatives pose as defenders of states' rights,
they are, in fact, drawing on an unexpectedly
nationalistic tradition. "Dual federalism" was a
doctrine developed by Chief Justice John Marshall and
his disciple Joseph Story, who held that the federal and
state governments should be as separate and distinct as
the governments of two states. The anti-Federalists
had originally sought concurrent responsibility for
administering federal law, which they thought would
increase state power; but in a famous compromise, the
Philadelphia Convention rejected that vision in favor
of the system of " dual sovereignty" in which the states
and federal government each had exclusive control
over their own spheres.
The overriding goal of "dual federalism," as it
developed during the Marshall era, was to protect a
weak national government from the power-hungry
states, rather than weak states from a bullying national
government. In 1842, Justice Story held that states
couldn't carry out important federal duties (such as
protecting the right of slave owners to recover their
fugitive slaves) because state officials were too
parochial, venal and demagogic to be trusted with
national responsibilities. And the question of who was
sovereign, the people of each state or the people of the
United States, was settled at Appomattox.
If the Supreme Court is seriously committed to
resurrecting the antebellum vision of "dual
sovereignty," the states might be reinvigorated, but in
a more subtle way than the Court's crude rhetoric
suggests. In the short term, many of the post-New Deal
regulatory schemes that the state and federal
governments administer together might be called into
question. For example, the welfare reform act of 1996,
which directs the states to administer federal block
grants, might be unconstitutional under the principle
announced in the Brady case. So might the motor voter
law, which commands state licensing agencies to
register federal voters. So might the Environmental
Protection Agency's regulations that delegate the
administration of federal clean water standards to
certain states. So might scores of unfunded mandates.
And so might the reporting requirements of the
Americans with Disabilities Act.
If the Court continues to bar the states from sharing
in federal responsibilities, Justices Stevens and Breyer
predict that the states will ultimately suffer. The
federal government, they suggest, will create massive
federal bureaucracies to administer programs that used
to be administered as federal-state partnerships. But
Stevens's and Breyer's fears may prove to be
overstated. A president who insists that the era of big
government is over and a Congress led by laissez-faire
Republicans are unlikely to create massive federal
bureaucracies.
As Roderick Hills of the University of Michigan
argues, the future of federalism will hinge on the
Court's vision of Congress's spending power. If the
justices decide that Congress can't intrude on state
sovereignty by imposing elaborate conditions on
federal spending, the states could indeed suffer greatly;
for Congress would stop using state officials to carry
out important federal functions. The federal
government would assume exclusive responsibility for
welfare, Social Security, Medicaid and defense; the
states would be reduced to regulating firearms within
1,000 feet of schools.
But it seems highly unlikely that a majority of the
Court will resurrect the vision of the spending power
that led President James Madison to veto an internal
improvements bill, on the grounds that Congress
lacked the enumerated power to build highways. As
long as Congress can use its spending power to
encourage states to administer federal programs
voluntarily, Hills suggests, the Brady decision could
ultimately prove to be a victory for state power,
because it will increase the states' ability to bargain for
larger grants and more discretion.
It is difficult to imagine how far the Court intends to
press its vision of dual federalism, largely because it is
difficult to resurrect antebellum notions in a post-New
Deal world. After Reconstruction and the New Deal,
however, we can no longer say, as Madison did, that
the powers of the national government are few and
defined. The New Deal crisis was solved in 1937,
when the Court acknowledged that the national and
local economies had become increasingly intertwined,
and judges could no longer distinguish local
"manufacture," over which the states had exclusive
control, from national " commerce," which was the
sole responsibility of Congress.
The manufacturing-commerce distinction collapsed
in 1937 not simply in the face of FDR's court-packing
threats, but also in the face of the economic realities of
the New Deal regulatory state. The attempt to
distinguish local production from its national effects
became increasingly unrealistic in a global economy,
which makes Justice Thomas's attempt to resurrect the
distinction in 1997 a provocative but self-indulgent
academic exercise. And so, between 1937 and 1995,
federal courts suggested, with winks and nods, that
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nothing Congress decided to regulate, from backyard
vegetable gardens to racial discrimination, had effects
on interstate commerce too remote to be
impermissible.
Viewed in a charitable light, the federalism
decisions of 1997 are an earnest effort by the Court to
resurect coherent limits on congressional power in an
age when it is no longer clear that coherent limits can
be resurrected. Ever since the Court abandoned the
effort to police the boundaries of federal power in
1937, the states have become more trustworthy
partners of the federal government, and more tempting
targets of federal commandeering. This is why the
Court's solution in the Brady case--allowing Congress
to encourage the states to administer federal programs
voluntarily, as long as it is willing to pay them for
their trouble--could be seen as a creative attempt to
translate the nineteenth-century principles of
federalism into a post-New Deal world.
The Court is surely right, furthermore, that most
serious threats to federalism today come not from
overly powerful state governments, as in the 1840s, but
from a federal government that is increasingly
addicted to symbolic legislation. The Gun-Free
Schools Act is troubling for the same reason as the
Americans with Disabilities Act: both noisily declare
the federal government's opposition to evils that no
one supports, and then order the states to worry about
the details of enforcement. In this way, Congress and
the president can reap political benefits without
incurring corresponding political costs. And when
feel-good laws co-opt state officers to administer
programs whose political benefits accrue to Congress
alone, it seems fair to wonder whether Justice Stevens
is correct that "unelected judges are better off leaving
the protection of federalism to the political process in
all but the most extraordinary circumstances."
But, although the Brady decision may be defensible
as a matter of public policy, it's hard to defend as a
matter of constitutional law. Justice Scalia's opinion
for the Court brings to mind the excesses of the
Warren Court, with its overconfident tone, its misuse
of history and its offhandedness about unsettling laws
and precedents without pretending to glance at the
constitutional text. ("Because there is no constitutional
text speaking to this precise question," says Scalia,
sounding very much like Justice Brennan, the answer
must be sought "in historical understanding and
practice, in the structure of the Constitution, and in the
jurisprudence of this Court.")
It's tempting, for those who sympathize with the
Court's decisions on policy grounds, to forgive the
justices for their activist turn. In an age when the
president and Congress have marginalized themselves
by embracing the politics of symbolic legislation, the
people are unlikely to take to the streets in defense of
federal prerogatives. By contrast, the Supreme Court,
flush with self-confidence, enjoys and deserves far
more popular respect than either of the political
branches.
But, to maintain that respect, the Court should resist
the temptation to save the president and Congress
from their own excesses. A recurring lesson of
constitutional politics in the twentieth century is the
overriding importance of judicial humility. In
applauding the demise of "dual federalism" in 1937,
Edwin Corwin wrote: "The obstinate adherence of the
Court in recent years to outmoded doctrines which
were largely of its own fabrication, and the arrogance
of certain of its opinions during this period, showed
the Court to be in the grip of a gravely erroneous
conception of its place in our system." If the
conservative justices intend to start down this self-
aggrandizing path again, perhaps they should recall
how history has treated their predecessors.
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